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Policymakers often refuse negotiations with terrorist groups for fear that those groups
will become legitimized in the eyes of the population, and that the state will become the
victim of future attacks as other groups attempt to emulate the negotiating group. While
scholars have analyzed whether or not negotiations are effective in ending terrorist
groups, scholarship is lacking as to whether or not policymakers’ fears regarding
legitimization are accurate. In this vein, I analyze the IRA/UK negotiations during the
Good Friday Accords using tobit regressions and Critical Discourse Analysis to
determine whether the IRA gained political legitimacy via their portrayal in news media.
According to my study, the IRA did not gain legitimacy; rather, the IRA’s violent
characteristics were delegitimized while their peaceful political motives were legitimized.
This suggests that policymakers need not fear negotiations with terrorist groups, as
negotiations may serve to delegitimize violence and terrorist tactics, while legitimizing
peace and politics.
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Introduction
On February 7, 1991, the Irish Republican Army launched a mortar attack on 10
Downing Street, the home of the British Prime Minister (PM) while the PM met with his
War Cabinet. Four were injured, but none were killed. Prime Minister Major condemned
the attack, stating that Britain’s ‘no negotiation’ policy had not changed by one iota. He
further elaborated that governments, democracies especially, must refuse to be
intimidated by terrorist groups (Cook and White, 1991). Despite his ‘no negotiation’
pronouncement, Major secretly held back-channel negotiations with IRA leaders in the
hope that such negotiations would lead to a cessation of hostilities. Major’s and Blair’s
negotiations eventually led to a negotiated agreement which included a ceasefire and a
Northern Ireland assembly.
While Major’s public stance and private negotiations conflict, these situations are
common (Neumann, 2007).1 Margaret Thatcher, for example, repeatedly stated ‘no
concessions’ policies towards the IRA, but reportedly contacted the Vatican and other
local Catholic leaders for third-party negotiations (Beckford 2010). Politicians claim that
negotiating with these groups rewards terrorists, leaving the government open to further
attack while legitimizing the group as a valid political actor. However, as Neumann
(2007) points out, governments frequently negotiate with these groups, often in secret.
The question then becomes, do negotiations with terrorist groups open the door for

1

Scholars have noted the prevalence in conflicting public-private stances in negotiations with terrorist
groups. See Browne and Dickson (2010) for a game theoretic explanation of such conflicts.
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further attacks and legitimize the group as a valid political actor? Do they create
dangerous precedents for future situations, and should politicians continue these public
pronouncements?

Theoretical Significance
With the growth of terrorism as a tactic in asymmetric warfare, methods to end its use are
necessary to reduce the global threat of terrorism. While terrorism prior to the 1960s
tended to be local, aimed at altering local perceptions and local political beliefs, terrorism
after the 1960s tended to be global, with terrorist groups and activities crossing state
borders or aimed at international targets within the terrorists’ home state (Kegley 2003).
The use of and utility in negotiation varies depending upon the study (Cronin 2009, Jones
and Libicki 2008, Lapan and Sandler 1988), though states tend to adopt ‘no negotiation’
stances. Two parallel assumptions guide these stances:
•

first, that negotiating reduces the credibility and strength of the state, leaving it
open to further attacks; and

•

second, that negotiating legitimizes the terrorist group as a valid political actor,
despite the group’s illegality and immorality in attacking civilians.

Several authors have examined the first justification (Cronin 2009, Jones and Libicki
2008, Hayes, Kaminski and Beres 2003). Beginning with the same question, their
findings generally differ depending upon their conceptualization of terrorist groups.
Some, such as Cronin (2009) find that negotiation works only as a supplemental to other
anti- and counter-terrorist actions. Jones and Libicki (2008), however, differ in their
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claim that over 40% of groups stop using terrorist tactics after negotiations. One of the
main differences in the two studies is how each author conceptualizes the terrorist group:
for example, Cronin includes splinter groups as continuations of the initial terrorist group,
while Jones and Libicki do not. This means that Jones and Libicki count more groups as
ending, while Cronin counts those groups as continuing under a different name.
Given the relative inattention to the second assumption, I examine whether a state
negotiating with a terrorist group legitimizes the group in the eyes of the broader public.
For the purposes of this study, the ‘broader public’ will include not only those individuals
directly involved in the conflict, such as members of the terrorist group, but also
uninvolved civilians within the state’s borders. Global groups such as Al Qaeda often fit
this distinction. While local terrorist groups such as the Armed Islamic Group in Algeria
may claim fealty to Al Qaeda, their operations are generally locally based, meaning that
their immediate leadership generally maintains smaller, more concrete preferences and
demands. In this way, negotiating with the nebulous Al Qaeda leadership may be
impossible; negotiating with each specific group with their specific demands becomes
possible when scholars and practitioners disaggregate the Al Qaeda network (Cronin
2010).
The ‘broader public’ group will be further disaggregated, as important differences
may exist between groups living in areas which terrorist groups control or live, versus the
population living within the target state. Since these groups have different relationships
with the terrorist group, it is likely that their view of the group as a legitimate, valid
political actor may differ.
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I essentially examine the veracity of a state-centered view of the world, where the
only legitimacy to be found resides in the state system. Such views often view legitimacy
as zero-sum, where any legitimacy gain by one organization must result in a loss of
legitimacy for the other organization. By suggesting that negotiations may ‘legitimize’
the terrorist group, policymakers offer an unspoken assumption that legitimacy belongs
only to non-terrorist groups, such as states and possibly non-violent non-state actors. By
assuming that legitimacy can only belong to certain organizations, policymakers
proscribe certain behavior by certain organizations (ex: violent behavior used by terrorist
organizations) as unacceptable, while allowing other behavior and organizations access to
the political system. The stated fear of gaining legitimacy through negotiations seems to
believe that state policymakers create legitimacy by setting the borders in which one may
act, but that legitimacy may also be held by organizations outside of those borders. This
conflicting belief and the associated concern with terrorist organizations gaining
legitimacy also belies the unspoken assumption that conferring legitimacy onto a terrorist
organization will weaken the legitimacy held by the state (the only truly ‘legitimate’
institution, as state-centric policymakers believe), thereby bringing the state and the
terrorist group to the same level of legitimacy. As such, in researching whether
negotiation legitimizes a violent non-state actor such as a terrorist group, I will also
analyze whether that negotiation impacts the legitimacy and strength of the state vis-à-vis
the terrorist group, thereby moving terrorist tactics into the accepted political sphere.

---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
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In this study, I define terrorism as the use of violence or threat of violence by a non-state
group against a civilian population in order to affect political change. While there are
several different definitions of terrorism, my definition includes the more common
components that generally appear in much of the literature (Kuznar 2007, Laquer 2001,
Long, 1990, Pape 2005). The study of terrorism broadly has tended to find that while
individuals may in fact act singly, most terrorism occurs as part of an organized,
centralized campaign (Hoffman 2006, Moghadam 2006).
These groups often fall into two categories, though the lines have recently blurred.
Domestic terrorist groups attack targets within and owned by the state government in
which they live. The Weathermen; the Covenant, the Sword and the Arm of the Lord; and
Greece’s 17 November are all examples of groups which attacked civilians or aspects of
the state in which the groups resided. These groups generally aim for more moderate
change – for example, the Weatherman and 17 November both identified as anarchist
revolutionary movements, meaning that they wished to overthrow and replace their
respective governments within a specific territory, while the fatalistic Covenant, the
Sword and the Arm of the Lord believed that they required protection from organizations
which they believe to be guided by satanic purposes. None of these sought a total
governmental overthrow over the entire country. They are classified as domestic terrorist
groups because the vast majority of their directives and attacks were designed to impact
their home country and their home government, though they may have occasionally
attacked a foreign national.
International terrorist groups either attack outside of the state in which they
reside, or attack within their state while targeting citizens or businesses of other states.

5

The main difference between domestic and international terrorist organizations is that,
while domestic groups seek to influence their domestic governments, international
organizations seek mainly to influence foreign governments. Though they may attack
their fellow citizens, the intention behind the attack was to influence the foreign
government. Al Qaeda, the Irish Republican Army, Jemaah Islamiya, and the Liberation
Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE/Tamil Tigers), are all examples of international terrorist
organizations.
In this study I am interested in the latter category, though the legitimacy of
domestic terrorist organizations vis-à-vis their state government is certainly important.
Domestic groups may be capable of more longevity, as they are based in the country in
which they attack, and may also be able to create a local support base. For example, we
can see extreme examples of potentially ‘legitimate’ terrorist groups in failed states, such
as Somalia2 where the organizations often provide the only functioning form of
governing, or in highly contested areas, such as in Mexico’s Chiapas Province in the
1990s when the Zapatista organization provided a governing body and social services to
indigenous Mexicans. Despite their importance in understanding legitimacy and
governing in these countries, domestic terrorist groups will be analyzed in a future paper.
The reason for focusing on international organizations rather than on domestic
organization is due to the highly publicized role of mature democracies in combating, and
being attacked by, international terrorist organizations. We must also remember however,
that groups are rarely ever completely domestic or entirely international; those lines are
2

Further, terrorist groups are not solely found in autocratic or failed states. As Chenoweth (2010) and
Parker (2007) show, terrorist groups can be frequently found in democracies. For Chenoweth, this occurs
because the open democratic space allows for the inclusion of small, violent groups (terrorists) to act, while
Parker focuses on the inability of democratic states to put repressive measures in place to counteract the
groups.
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frequently blurred, especially since the growth in foreign direct investment. Certain
organizations, such as 17 November, may attack foreign nationals, while certain
international groups, such as the LTTE, may focus their efforts to a large degree on
domestic territorial control. There is also the concern of umbrella organizations, such as
Al Qaida, which may claim the loyalty of smaller organizations while those organizations
carry out mainly domestic attacks.
There appear to be two main questions when researching terrorist organizations.
First, there is the question of how and why terrorist groups begin. This question has been
analyzed extensively in scholarly journals, newspapers, and on television. In fact, The
West Wing, a 1999-2006 fictionalized portrayal of life in the White House’s West Wing,
devoted an entire episode to the question of how and why terrorist groups form (Isaac
and Ishmael, 3/10/2001). Like many scholars, the episode did not end with a clear answer
as to how and why the groups formed. Rather, scholars believe that groups may form for
a variety of reasons: stunted peaceful political change, competition among groups leading
to violent acts, rationally determining how to achieve change, and psychological
disorders (Cronin 2006, Jones and Libicki 2008, Oots 1989, Weinburg and Pedahzur
2004).
Scholars have also discovered that generally, terrorist groups end by member
defection, local policing, or co-optation into a peace political system through negotiation
with a state government (Bapat 2006, Cronin 2009, Jones and Libicki 2008). Scholars
differ on the efficacy of negotiation, however. While Cronin (2008) finds that only 18%
of terrorist groups end via negotiation, Jones and Libicki‘s (2009) study raises that
percentage to 43%, with the main difference appearing to be in how they define ‘end’.
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Further, Bapat’s (2006) model finds that once groups have negotiated with state
governments, governments that moderately constrict the group while still allowing the
group room to maneuver are more likely to see a positive end to the negotiation. Bapat’s
model only examines hostage-taking incidents by specific terrorists, while Cronin and
Jones and Libicki examine a variety of terrorist attacks and organizations over time. Due
to the different conceptualizations within the studies, we can begin to see why studying
terrorist attacks and organizations become difficult.
When examining their legitimacy, terrorist groups are, at the outset, assumed to
be illegitimate in a state-centric world as they intentionally utilize violent tactics against
unarmed civilian populations (Feste 2010, 41). Aggressively violent non-state actors who
purposefully attack civilians and noncombatants, these groups often appear as bullies,
harassing or blackmailing states through bombings, kidnappings, assassinations, and
other internationally illegal actions (ibid). The perception of terrorist groups by some
local populations as fighting on behalf of a cause despite the violent actions serves to
create legitimacy for the terrorist group within that population (Hoffman 2006, Feste
2010, Pape 2005). Despite potentially increased legitimacy in the eyes of the population,
however, international terrorist campaigns rarely appear to gain legitimacy in the eyes of
the target population – namely, the population of the target government. While the groups
may demand policy change more than legitimacy itself, negotiating with a group
presupposes that the other side deems the group legitimate enough to consider as a valid
political actor. While the target government or target population may not support or view
as legitimate the terrorist group’s policies or actions, their existence and ability to act on
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the political scene as a negotiating partner is often viewed as a symbolic acceptance of
their role as a political actor (Franck 1994)
This legitimacy differential, with the host community potentially supporting and
the target community opposing, creates tension between the two population groups, and
may further buttress the terrorist organization in the eyes of the local population.
Simultaneously, politicians and policymakers in the target country increasingly stress ‘no
negotiation’ policies, refusing to consider talking with a group they publically consider to
be illegitimate. It must also be remembered, though, that the terrorist group may be
illegitimate within the local population. While some groups seem to hold on to their
base’s legitimacy (ex. IRA, Zapatistas, FARC), other groups appear to lose that
legitimacy over time (ex. Red Brigade).
Several scholars have examined the first aspect of ‘no negotiation’ policies –
namely, whether negotiation leaves the state open to further attack (Cronin 2009; Hayes,
Kaminski and Beres 2003). Generally, these scholars differentiate terrorist groups into
two types: absolute and conditional. Zartman (2003) defines ‘absolute’ groups as those
who complete an act that is not to obtain some other goal but rather to achieve some
unlimited cause, such as suicide bombers (p444). These groups or individuals are beyond
negotiating, as negotiations require a mutually acceptable goal. Absolute groups by
definition have no mutually acceptable goal.
Conditional groups, however, use terrorist tactics as a means to achieve some
immediate payoff, such as hostage taking (Zartman, 2003, p445). While these groups or
individuals are believed to be receptive to negotiation, most terrorist attacks occur as part
of a larger campaign, meaning that negotiation with the campaign leadership may be
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capable of ending terrorism on a broader scale, rather than on specific case by case basis.
For example, while negotiators may be able to bring a specific action to an end, as in the
case of hostage taking, this does not necessarily mean that the campaign itself will end.
For this reason, it is important to understand the true nature of the organization and the
campaign. Campaigns such as the IRA’s may have been best solved by negotiating with
the campaign leadership over time, while negotiators may find better results in discussing
individual attacks with Jamaat al’Islamiya, rather than attempting to locate and negotiate
with the broader Al Qaida leadership.
Other scholars examined specific aspects of negotiation outcomes to determine
whether the agreements themselves, rather than the process of negotiating, alter the
likelihood of attacks. Goerzig (2010) finds that ‘no concessions policies’, while often
politically desirable for the state, lead to deterrence (4). Rather, the increase or decrease
in attacks is determined by how other groups view the application of concessions.
Goerzig found that when concessions apply to the entire population, rather than selected
groups within the terrorist organization, other groups exhibit copycat behavior,
mimicking the original group’s willingness to end their aggressive behavior (10).
However, when the state uses selective concessions, applying those concessions only to
the specific terrorist group, other groups perceive those concessions as a policy failure for
larger society and tend to innovate with new, deadlier attacks (Goerzig, 2010 21).
Bapat (2006) writes that negotiations where the state maintains moderate control
over the group bring the most success, while states that maintain too little control, or
attempt to maintain too much control, will fail. Chenoweth, Miller and McClellan (2009)
also show that the failure of negotiations, whether in that negotiations break down or
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attacks continue, is not solely due to the terrorist group. They stress states’ ‘no
negotiations’ policies as hurdles over which many terrorist groups cannot jump (183).
They take issue with emphasizing a group’s inability to compromise or follow through
with promises, and wish for scholars to study how the distrustful state may, in fact,
impede successful negotiation. While the research of negotiating with terrorist groups
continues to examine this aspect, it has yet to empirically evaluate whether negotiation
confers legitimacy upon the terrorist group (Toros 2008).
Further, since terrorist groups must maintain public approval and support in order
to carry out their missions, literature on asymmetric negotiation and two-level games is
also important in understanding how and why terrorists negotiate, as well as whether that
negotiation will indeed confer legitimacy upon the terrorist group as a valid political
actor. Regardless of the growth of non-state actors since the 1980s and 1990s, states still
remain as the most powerful force in international relations (Putnam 1998).
Non-state actors, such as non-governmental organizations, however, do indeed
work at the international level. These groups may serve as advisors during negotiations,
but often are not allowed voting rights. The Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO)
has held such status at the UN since the 1970s, though it was granted a slightly upgraded
version as a ‘non-member observer’, which entitles it to vote on procedural issues and
sign declarations (UN General Assembly, 11/29/2012) Since these non-state groups lack
the military force and financial resources of most states, they generally engage in
‘asymmetric negotiation’, where the traditionally ‘weaker’ side may use bargaining
tactics, time, media prowess, and issue-linkage in an attempt to decrease the power
imbalance (Daoudy 2009) and gain approval for their cause. In the case of terrorists, it is
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possible that terrorist groups, though traditionally weaker than state governments, may be
able to use issue-linkage and other tactics to gain the upper hand in negotiation.3
Two-level games are certainly important on the state side as well, especially in the
case of representative governments that rely on popular support. Browne and Dickson
(2010) analyzed this aspect of negotiations when they question why state leaders
publically hold to ‘no negotiation’ policies while privately and secretly negotiating with
terrorist group leaders. They found that publically stating such a policy serves a strategic
purpose, as it makes the negotiation more costly for the state and thereby reduces the
state’s acceptable win-set (381). This occurs because after publically denouncing a
terrorist group, failed negotiations become far more costly for the state leader should he
or she have to inform the domestic audience.
Finally, two-level game approaches incorporate the needs, beliefs, and desires of
sub-state actors in international negotiations. Here, official negotiators must include the
demands of substate actors in their negotiations; it is always possible for any negotiation
agreement to be vetoed by important sub-state actors (Boyer 2000, Shamir and Shakiki
2005, Putnam 1988, Knopf 1993, Schoppa 1993). In the case of states, these sub-state
actors may be bureaucracies, important elites, non-profit organizations, businesses, or
lobbyist groups, all of whom must be considered when developing a negotiation win-set
at the international level. Because terrorists generally form organizations, however, it is
possible that they can be conceptualized in a similar manner, with the terrorist negotiator
consistently negotiating with their domestic audiences or organization elites. Any

3

However, certain scholars, notably Nicolaidis (1999) feel that negotiation itself implies power symmetry,
as absolutely weak and absolutely powerful countries do not negotiate. Rather, the weak surrender and the
strong conquer. Only during situations of relative power symmetry, where neither side can win and a
stalemate ensues, does negotiation occur.
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unfavorable agreement may, in fact, be vetoed by these individuals or groups. Favorable
or not, however, the simple act of a state negotiating with the group may serve to
legitimize it as a valid political actor in an international system which is predisposed
toward states rather than non-state groups (Toros 2008). For the purposes of this study, I
use two-level games less as a model for analyzing whether negotiations impact a terrorist
group’s legitimacy, and more as a guiding heuristic to understand the role of including
multiple levels of actors. I do not assume that two-level games will explain terrorist
legitimacy through negotiations, but rather view its importance in stressing the role of
different population levels in international relations.
Legitimacy and legitimate actors are also a matter of debate in scholarly literature.
As Thirkell-White points outs, ‘legitimacy’ is important in deciding whether international
rules are fair and rational, with legitimacy a matter of degree (2006, 335). For who makes
international rules, such as which actors are accepted into the international system,
determines not only the shape and outcome of those rules, but also whether others will
determine those rules to be satisfactory and accede. Further, “power relationships will
mean that political legitimacy (securing enough consent to get on with what one wishes
to achieve) and moral legitimacy will not always align” (Thirkell-White, 2006, 336).
Such is often the case with terrorist groups who claim moral legitimacy against an
overwhelming oppressor, but lack the military power that seems to define statehood
(Fabre 2008). Gelpi (2003) further concludes that institutions are legitimate if they are
responsive to the demand and needs of a population. Terrorist organizations, especially
groups such as Hamas and the IRA, believe they are legitimate as they, rather than the
government, often provide social services and welfare to a population. At first, these
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services may be only to arrange for the immediate support of the local population, but,
over time, may become institutionalized, as is often the case in the Palestinian Territories.
As Thirkell-White (2006) later explains, institutions are legitimate only if:
o They serve a purpose or provide a good which makes up for the loss of
freedom in submitting to their authority;
o Rule-makers are well qualified based on technical expertise and
representative status;
o Rule-makers use their power for the good of the institution rather than for
their own selfish benefit; and
o The institutions garner public consent (340).

While scholars may differ on operationalizing legitimacy, consent appears to be a
common focus (Fabre 2008). Hurd (1999) echoes Thirkell-White by defining legitimacy
as the normative belief that a rule or institution should be obeyed (381). He stresses the
subjective nature of norms, focusing on how legitimacy is perceived, rather than
perpetual. If legitimacy is truly perception rather than eternal, then understanding how
legitimacy is perceived by actors, and how those perceptions can not only change but
influence how other actors are allowed to behave, becomes central to understanding
international relations. In the current world, with state-centered politics viewed as the
most legitimate avenue for interaction (Starkey, Boyer and Wilkenfeld 2010), the rise of
non-state actors in international politics and their attending legitimacy and acceptability
begins to question whether our understanding of legitimacy as only state-based is
accurate. Since the ‘rules of the game’ in international politics is that states matter most,
whether these perceived rules still hold, and their continually changing impact on actors’
behavior plays an important role in determining the relationship people, states, and non-

14

state actors. As Thirkell-White (2006) points out, “legitimacy will therefore always be a
matter of degree and should be seen as a set of complex trade-offs, rather than a simple
all-or-nothing” (340).
From the perspective of a terrorist group, reducing the legitimacy and authority of
the state can serve as a catapult for their cause (Marighella 2002 [1969]). While
Marighella assumed that the loss of legitimacy resulted from a draconian state response
to terror, such as harsh police tactics against civilians and noncombatants, the basic
assumption remains the same in his work and in the policymakers’ fears. Parker (2007)
found that repressive tactics such as targeted Israeli assassinations of high-ranking
Palestinians did indeed serve to increase popular support for Hamas.4
If one understands legitimacy as a spectrum, ranging from completely illegitimate
to completely legitimate, then perceptions of legitimacy may move from one side of the
spectrum to the other depending on the situation. While not necessarily zero-sum, the
movement of legitimacy from the state to the terrorist group can spell trouble for the
state, in that legitimacy serves as social control (Hurd 1999, Dahl and Lindblom 1992).
As Gilley (2009) writes, legitimacy must be viewed as a waxing and waning process, and
legitimacy levels rarely remain static. Further, his survey shows that “legitimacy creates a
sense of political obligation for citizens to comply with state rules and edicts” (84).
Should the public view the terrorist group as more legitimate than the state, or at least
gaining in legitimacy, this could mean further disruption on behalf of the terrorist group.
4

When operationalizing legitimacy, scholars tend to focus attention on public opinion surveys, asking
whether or not a constituency supports an institutions or political officer. Legitimacy, however, is more
than merely public approval. It incorporates such varied information as public opinion, trust, control of the
military, recognition by other state governments or nongovernment organizations, and other concepts [see
Gelpi 2003, Norris 1999, Franck 1990, and Nadarajah and Sriskandarajah 2005 ]. Public opinion data is
necessary but not sufficient definition of legitimacy, despite the fact that it is often used as the main, if not
sole, measure of legitimacy.
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This is the exact situation which our policymakers fear, and from which stems their
concerns over negotiations with terrorist groups.
Hurd (1999) provides five different ways of capturing legitimacy within
international relations, including whether other power centers aid/support an institution,
and whether that institution fits logically within the broader social structure. While Hurd
specifically questions whether sovereignty as an institution is legitimate, his
conceptualization of legitimacy mentioned above is useful for this study. Further, Hughes
(1990) urges negotiation with terrorist groups as a means of them achieving legitimacy,
as doing so may provide an avenue for terrorist leaders to abandon their violent actions
and move toward a more peaceful political resolution. Neumann (2007) disagrees with
Hughes’ call for negotiations, but agrees that doing so provides an aspect of legitimacy;
he claims that negotiation will confer legitimacy upon terrorist groups, and for that very
reason urges policymakers to refuse negotiation attempts. Despite the arguments on both
sides, no scholar has empirically tested whether these claims are true. It is into this hole
that my study falls, attempting to answer whether or not negotiating with non-state actors
such as terrorist groups serves to legitimize the group in the eyes of the broader public.
Easton’s (1965) work accepts the role of legitimacy in validating governments in
the eyes of their population, but disaggregates legitimacy into diffuse and specific
support. Diffuse support generally refers to whether or not the constituents favor the
ideals behind governing institutions, and the broad institutions themselves, while specific
support considers whether the constituents support the specific people in power and
whether the current governmental policies are favored. Norris (1999) further expanded
upon Easton by disaggregating his diffuse and specific support into 5 separate
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dimensions, ranging from an attachment to broad regime principals and specific political
actors (pp10-12). Her categories include broad support for the political community itself,
namely, whether one feels connected to and proud of the larger society; and also the
principals and ideals around which the governing institutions are based. In her work, she
mainly focuses on democracies and newly democratizing governments, so her regimes
and principals tend to revolve around democracy. She includes these categories because,
as Franck (1990) correctly asserts, legitimacy is more than simple, short-run coercive
power (15). Thus, legitimacy cannot be created overnight by an all-powerful dictator.
Rather, legitimacy must be earned over time, and those long-term norms help create
patterns of behavior such as trust and support (Franck, 1990; Booth and Seligson, 2009).
Booth and Seligson (2009) further study this phenomenon when they assert that diffuse
support often trumps specific support in maintaining regimes in Latin American
countries.
Norris (1999) does finds that trust in the regime’s performance impacts whether
the constituents view the regime as legitimate, with decreases in performance negatively
impacting trust in government. Though Booth and Seligson (2009) point out that negative
performance may not topple a regime, Norris shows that negative performance can
reduce trust in institutions over time. Finally, she includes two specific arenas of support
and trust, with support for regime institutions and individual, current political actors. By
further disaggregating Easton’s (1965) diffuse/support dichotomy, Norris is able to more
fully capture the multidimensionality of legitimacy.
In this study, I adopt Norris’ analysis of legitimacy by determining whether
different populations increase or decrease their multidimensional support of terrorist
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groups when those groups enter into negotiations with state governments. While I agree
with Norris that Easton’s diffuse and specific support require further disaggregation, I
merge her dimensions into 3 ranges of legitimacy. First, I merge her more abstract
Political Community and Regime Principals dimensions into a single ‘Diffuse’ heuristic,
though in my study I include research on both aspects. Support for, and trust in, the
performance of the terrorist remains a discrete category, while Regime Institutions and
Political Actors are merged into ‘specific’ support. Though her study focused on
democratic government institutions and actors, it seems likely that her categories can help
illuminate the perceived legitimacy of certain non-state actors, such as terrorist groups,
especially as these groups frequently claim to be the one true ‘voice’ of the domestic
population.
My theory is that in order to negotiate, terrorist groups must first gain a base
measure of legitimacy in order to be considered as valid political actors in the eyes of the
target states. While negotiating, that validity is transferred to the population of the target
government5. As such, my theory includes three parts: pre-negotiation, during
negotiation, and post-negotiation legitimacy. Since including terrorist groups in a
negotiation presupposes a base measure of legitimacy, if we measure legitimacy as being
deemed a valid political actor via growing positive media portrayal, then these groups
must have some measure of legitimacy vis-à-vis the negotiating government. 6

5

Target government, target population, and domestic population will be further described below.
As Gilley (2009) writes, there are different aspects or types of legitimacy – consent, legality,
and justification. Legality means that the group achieved and exercises power in accordance with
the community’s laws (Gilley, 2009, 6). Terrorist groups do not have this type of legitimacy if the
eyes of the target population or target government, as they came to power using violence for
political purposes against civilians. However, they may gain legality in the eyes of the domestic
population among whom they live prior to the negotiation, provided that the domestic population
allows for violent attacks in pursuit of a goal. This legality in the eyes of the domestic population

6
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It must be noted, though, that support and legitimacy will vary depending upon
the population. It is likely that the domestic population will view the terrorist groups with
diffuse support and specifically legitimate, while the target state government may only
view the group’s specific leaders at the time of negotiation positively. For this reason, it
is important to analyze both population’s view of legitimacy differently; they may all
hold different conceptions of the group’s legitimacy.
My theory can be summed up as follows:
•

Terrorist groups will have diffuse support, and specific legitimacy among the
domestic population prior to negotiations.

•

The rise in legitimacy will eventually allow the target state government to view
the group as political actors.

•

Terrorist groups will increase their specific and support legitimacy among the
target state government and target population as a result of the negotiation
Since my cases will all be groups who utilized international terrorism7, I break the

‘populations’ into four separate categories. First, the terrorist groups and the population
living in the area in which groups reside form the ‘domestic’ population. Second, the

will eventually reach a level at which point the target state government will view the group as a
political actor.
However, terrorist groups may gain justification or consent. Justification occurs when
organizations follow the rules and norms of a society, regardless of whether the rules themselves
are considered legitimate. (Gilley, 6). Here, while the actions of the terrorist group vis-à-vis the
attacked civilians may be viewed poorly, by including them in the larger political system, states
may symbolically confer justified legitimacy by forcing the group to follow accepted negotiation
rules.6 Consent legitimacy follows from justification, and means that people agree to view
decisions stemming from justification as proper and binding.
7
Groups use international terrorism when they attack another state or the civilians or business of
another state. Those civilians or business may be physically in the land in which the terrorists
live. For example, the AL Qaeda affiliates who attacked the World Trade Center in New York
City on 9/11/2001 used international terrorism. Hezbollah’s kidnapping of Brian Keenan, and
Irishman teaching at the University of Beirut in 1986, is also considered international terrorism.
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target government and the population that resides in the state controlled by the target
population for the ‘international’ population:
Domestic Populations:
•

Terrorist Group

•

Population in which the Terrorist Group resides

International Populations:
•

Target State Government

•

Population of the Target State Government

Since the aim of international terrorism is to coerce the target state by way of
angering or instilling fear among that state’s population, it is important to look at our two
populations separately. Future studies may wish to disaggregate the two populations
further, and attempt to analyze whether, for example, policymakers and citizens view the
groups differently at different times. In this study, however, I collapse the government
and government populations into a single ‘domestic’ or ‘international’ constituency. This
occurs merely due to the lack of available data, rather than as an indication of the
unimportant nature of disaggregation. I had originally hoped to view each of the four
populations individually; unfortunately that is not possible at this time. By grouping the
government and government populations together into two umbrella categories, we can
instead determine whether there is an overall difference in the way in which people think
about terrorist groups depending upon whether they were the population specifically
impacted by the attacks or they were the group’s broader targets. Also, as the domestic
constituency and the international constituency may hold vastly different prior beliefs
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regarding the terrorist groups, how and whether those groups gain legitimacy in their eyes
may be drastically different, as described above.
Since both groups differ in their initial support for and belief in the legitimacy of
the terrorist organization, they will not view the group’s diffuse and specific support in
the same manner. The target government and population, for example, may increase its
trust in specific support, such as its views of the group’s leaders and performance, while
not increasing its diffuse support of the organization’s principals, even after inviting the
group to participate in a negotiation.
Due to data collection concerns, I am only capable of measuring support and
legitimacy via media portrayal at this time. I use a Tobit analysis to determine changes in
specific support over time, and Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) to show how hidden
beliefs about ‘truth’, ‘rightness’, ‘morality’, and ‘power’ are created, upheld, or altered.
For this study, I use CDA to comprehend how portrayals of the violent IRA and peaceful
Sinn Fein have changed over time to garner a better understanding of how populations
view the organizations and their proper roles in society.
Since there are two populations8, and different ranges of support, I hold the
following hypotheses.
Domestic Population (Domestic)
1a. After negotiations, the domestic population will view the terrorist group and its violence as more
legitimate, as measured by positive portrayal
1b. Before negotiation, the domestic population will view the terrorist group and its violence as more
legitimate, as measured by positive portrayal.
Target Government/Populations (International)
2a. After negotiations, the international population will view the terrorist group and its violence as
more legitimate, as measured by positive portrayal
2b. Before negotiations, the international population will view the terrorist group and its violence as

8

I assume from the start that the terrorist group already assumes they are legitimate political
actors and therefore do not need to be convinced of their own legitimacy.
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less legitimate, as measured by negative portrayal

Chapter Layout:
My study is divided between five separate sections. This Introduction examines
the theories of asymmetric negotiation and legitimacy of non-state actors. I discuss the
differences between the idea of a fixed ‘legitimacy pie’ under a Westphalian state system,
as opposed to an ever expanding legitimacy realm as envisioned by liberal and poststructural theorists. Westphalian sovereignty typically assumes a zero-sum legitimacy
game, where a legitimacy win for one negotiation side requires a loss of negotiation for
the other. This idea of a fixed ‘legitimacy pie’ underlies the call to ‘No Negotiation’
policies by politicians who fear including violent non-state actors in international politics,
for the stated fear of further legitimating said group in the eyes of the broader public.
As Gerring (2001) states, conceptual validity is especially important in abstract
terms such as legitimacy, power, and rights, for how can we truly know the singular
definition of legitimacy (43)? Therefore, this chapter will analyze how different scholars
conceptualize and operationalize legitimacy to determine the most appropriate
understanding for this study.
Since my study seeks to answer whether negotiations add or reduce the legitimacy
of negotiation partners, a broader view of negotiations over time is required. My study
will not include a cross-national large-N survey, as cross-national conceptualizations of
legitimacy may undermine the very complex nature of the topic (Booth and Seligson,
2009, 23). Rather than utilize a cross-national study, I focus instead on a single case – the
IRA/UK Good Friday Agreement of 1997-1998. Signed in April 1998, the Agreement
took nearly a full year between the IRA’s initial July 1997 ceasefire, the substantive
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negotiations, and the conclusion. I will divide the 10 months of the ceasefire and
negotiations into four separate time periods, with an additional post-negotiation July 1998
period to determine whether legitimacy levels changed after the negotiation.
Chapter One provides a detailed history of the modern IRA and the conflict in
Northern Ireland, and provides the reasoning behind using the Good Friday Agreement as
the chosen negotiation. Though the chapter includes information on the conflict in the
1970s and 1980s, the Good Friday process did not begin until 1997. Chapter Two
explains the methodology used in this study. Since legitimacy is such a nebulous term, I
employ the qualitative Critical Discourse Analysis, a text analysis that looks specifically
for unspoken assumption, power relations, and views on legitimacy, and a quantitative
analysis. For the purposes of this study, I chose to utilize newspaper articles from two
newspapers: the Belfast Telegraph and The Times (London). As two of the most highly
circulated newspapers in their respective countries, they should serve as a proxy for the
domestic and international views on the IRA, Sinn Fein, and the Agreement. Chapter
Two will further clarify how articles were chosen and coded, and how Critical Discourse
Analysis understands the intentionality of text. Chapters Three and Four examine the
portrayal of the IRA, Sinn Fein, and the Agreement in both newspapers quantitatively
and qualitatively, respectively. They determine whether different populations portray the
organizations differently and whether those organizations are granted legitimacy as
political actors by the newspapers.
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Chapter 1: History of the IRA
In 1972, Joe Mcllroy, a Catholic nationalist, was killed in his home by unionist
gunmen for moving his family into a traditionally unionist neighborhood. (Carey 2012)
His children remained asleep upstairs, awoken by the commotion after the shooting. In
2011, Joe Mcllroy’s nephew, Rory Mcllroy, won the U.S. Open. During the publicized
celebrations just after his final putt, the tricolor Irish Republican flag was thrown at him,
which he caught instinctively. (Breen 2011) As the cameras zoomed in, Northern Irish
viewers were surprised to see that he was intentionally no longer holding the flag, a
traditional symbol of the Nationalists in Northern Ireland. Deemed a ‘neutral’ sport,
unlike Gaelic football or Protestant rugby (Carey 2012), golf provided an avenue for all
Northern Irish to band together and cheer on their fellow countryman. This turnaround,
where a Catholic Northern Irish from a nationalist family was cheered on by all Northern
Irish – nationalist and unionist – and who refused the traditional divisive symbol – the
tricolor flag – was unheard of two decades previously. Since the Good Friday Accords,
groups have sprung up in Northern Ireland designed to bring nationalist and unionist
neighborhoods together, and have pointed to people such as Rory Mcllroy as exemplars
of a society trying to knit itself back together after decades of violent conflict. The
methods for this reunification are many, but all point back to a seminal moment in time –
the signing of the Good Friday Accords in 1998.
The Good Friday Accords was chosen as an appropriate case for a variety of
reasons, all of which serve to make it a foundational example to understand how terrorist
groups can be brought into the peaceful political system and how perception and reality
intertwine in the media. Several scholars agree that the complex discussions brought
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about an end to a seemingly intractable violent situation, with profound domestic and
international significance. (Coakley 2002, Ruane and Todd 1999, Cox, Guelke and
Stephen 2000, and de Breadun 2001) First, the culmination of nearly 10 years of repeated
political maneuvers by the IRA, nationalist movements, the British government, and
international forces such as the United States, the Good Friday Accords provided an
avenue for nationalist and unionist Northern Irish to engage in dialogue rather than
violent acts. Second, the case allows us to examine the differing perceptions among
different targets: the public, terrorist supporters, and the government. (Criado 2011, 498)
The support for, and legitimacy of, the IRA and Sinn Fein,
…can be a sign of the terrorist group’s strength, and, therefore, of
its bargaining position within the government. The violence
unleashed by the terrorist organization is actually its main asset to
increase its bargaining position in a future negotiation to attain its
political goals…Therefore, an increase in violence can have a
positive impact on political support. However… an increase in
violence…can also lead to diminishing support from the
population. Certain forms of terrorist attacks could be considered
unjustifiable by the population, undermining the terrorist’
favorable audience. (Criado 2011, 499).
This focus on the action of terrorist groups links to policymakers’ fears that
allowing the group a seat at the negotiating table will legitimize both the group and their
violent tactics. The fear that “terrorist groups convene truces in order to start
conversations…” (Criado 2011, 499) while maintaining their violent tactics often keeps
policymakers from investigating the possibility of bringing the group into the political
system as a means of pacifying their violent tendencies. We can see from the Good
Friday process the fear that allowing the IRA, via Sinn Fein, a seat at the negotiating
table, as well as the concern that allowing such a seat would legitimize violent tactics as
a means of achieving goals. Midlarsky et al (1980) provide support for this view of
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legitimizing violence when they point to a violent contagion in the 1960-1970s in
Northern Ireland. In their article, they show that people may become conditioned to
violence over time, with violence becoming routine, acceptable, and desirable (273). If
this is indeed how terrorist violence spreads, then there is support for not legitimizing
terrorist groups, and thereby not legitimizing their tactics. If, however, a negotiation
served to legitimize peace rather than violence, then it may be an appropriate strategy.
The pathway to the Good Friday Accords and eventual peace experienced several
stages, all of which included important stumbling blocks and moderately successful
maneuvers that merged in 1997-1998, becoming the peace process. The first stage, the
initial ‘Troubles’, lasted from the 1960s through the early 1980s, though the IRA itself
began far earlier. The second stage, the beginning of the move towards peace and away
from violence, occurred during the mid-1980s through 1993. During this time, Sinn
Fein/IRA and unionist leadership gradually altered the mindset of unionist and IRA
members so that they would allow for re-entry into the political system. At the same
time, moderate unionist and nationalist leaders such as John Hume became middlemen,
through whom messages could be passed and interactions conducted. In the final stage,
from 1994 until 1998, both sides tentatively agreed to allow the peaceful political
process a chance. Though this was often interrupted by small scale and occasional largescale violence, such as the 1996 bombing of Canary Warf which ended the IRA’s 1994
ceasefire, leaders from all parties agreed that violent tactics were not effective in the
long run and continued to pressure even their most hardline members to accept peaceful
resolutions. This culminated in the Good Friday Accords, which fraught as it was with
conflict and backbiting, brought with it the eventual end to large-scale terrorism in
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Northern Ireland. In this chapter, I will examine the different stages of the conflict, and
show how the pathways converged to become the Good Friday peace process. I will also
examine how perceptions of the IRA and its legitimacy changed during these periods.
Through the 1970s: The Beginning and the Troubles
Stemming from an initially-peaceful national civil rights protest movements and
moving quickly into an incredibly violent campaign which resulted in nearly 3500 deaths
and thousands more injured (Rogers 2010), the ‘Long War’ between the IRA and the
United Kingdom largely ended due to the 1998 Good Friday Accords (GFA). While
violence continues in Northern Ireland, it is the result of breakaway republican groups
who disagreed with the IRA’s role in the (GFA), such as the ‘Real’ IRA or RIRA. The
IRA itself accepted the peaceful and political GFA, despite their decades-long policy
against accepting the UK Westminster Parliament as the legitimate governing body of
Northern Ireland. As Rogers (2010) writes, Ulster was a battleground, where republican
groups, loyalist paramilitaries and government security forces fought constantly in a
continuous barrage of beatings, shootings, kidnappings, assassinations, and bombings.
Even as late as 1997, the IRA continued its military campaign, yet a year later they had
given up a militaristic policy, agreed to turn over their weapons, and broadly accepted
electing members to Parliament.
The history of the Provisional Irish Republican Army (IRA) in Northern Ireland
has been one of adaptation. Beginning in the 1910s, the IRA initially waged a guerilla
war to remove the United Kingdom from the island of Ireland in an attempt to regain
control of the territory. (Hopkinson, 2004) Led by men such as Michael Collins, Eammon
de Valera, and Tom Clark and initially called the Irish Volunteers, the original IRA
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succeeded in creating a short-lived parliament, the Dail, after the Easter Uprising of 1916.
Sinn Fein, a young and normally non-violent umbrella organization for nationalist groups
in Ireland, eventually publically supported the IRA’s armed tactics, which led to their
close association and eventual direct links in the 1960s onward (Feeney 2002). After the
1919-1921 civil war, the UK Government agreed to grant freedom to the southern and
western 26 counties of the Irish island, while maintaining control of the northeastern 6
counties referred to as ‘Ulster’. The new Republic of Ireland parliament declared the Irish
Volunteers to be the official army of Ireland, a fact that later IRA members used in part to
justify their actions in Northern Ireland. Northern Ireland maintained its own domestic
parliament while being represented at Westminster due to the 1949 Ireland Act. Despite
their separation, the government of the Republic of Ireland declared in Article 3 of their
1932 constitution that, “[i]t is the firm will of the Irish Nation… to unite all the people
who share the territory of the island of Ireland…” (Constitution of Ireland). This
constitutional claim over the entirety of the Irish island was and remained the IRA’s
portrayed legal justification to continue their efforts to reunite Ulster and the Republic.
Despite publicly claiming pluralism, Northern Ireland was essentially a one-party
state led by the Ulster Unionist Party from 1949 on. Unionist representatives maintained
over 60% of Northern Ireland seats in Westminster between 1921 and 1969, with the
Northern Ireland home government ruled by Unionists despite 42% of Northern Ireland
being of Catholic, nationalist descent by 1991 (Coakley 2002, 8). Therefore, the Catholic,
historically Irish minority lacked representation, whether we define representation as
descriptive or substantive, often due to gerrymandering which reduced the voting efficacy
of Catholics. For example, gerrymandering in Londonderry split the Catholic population
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to increase Protestant votes for council elections, and election laws declared that only
ratepayers or householders were allowed to vote at all – which meant that Protestant
Unionist council leaders often delayed or outright refused to build housing in
predominantly Catholic area (“Civil Rights 1967-1969”). The combination of these two
policies meant that, when Catholics could vote, the larger Protestant majority often
overrode their vote.
They suffered from de jure and de facto discrimination in employment and
housing, congregating in mainly Catholic urban ghettos in areas such as the Bogside
section of Belfast (Coakley 2002, 8).9 When the ideals of civil rights began spreading
globally in the 1960s, the Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association (NICRA), composed
mainly of Catholics and nationalists, began peaceful civil rights protests (Shanahan 2009,
13). They demanded, among other things, an end to employment discrimination and
gerrymandering caused by institutionalized racism, as well as the repeal of the Special
Powers legislation of 1922, which allowed the Northern Ireland police forces (RUC)
special police powers to maintain peace and authority (Ibid, 13). Rather than launch
violent protests, NICRA held marches, strikes and sit-ins, designed after the peaceful
protest movements of Ghandi and Martin Luther King, Jr. One of the nationalist leaders,
Austin Currie, gained international fame by leading a sit-in to protest how public housing
was unfairly allocated to Protestant families, despite the larger list of Catholic families
waiting for government-subsidized housing (“Civil Rights 1967-1969”). Fueled by the
global anti-discrimination commitment of the 1960s, reporters began analyzing Northern
Ireland government policies, often determining that Catholics were indeed subjected to
institutionalized racism. Even The Times (London), a pro-UK government publication,
Good Friday Accords
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declared that the Northern Ireland government at Stormont treated the Catholic
nationalist population as second-class citizens (Ibid).
Protests and marches continued in Northern Ireland, led largely by NICRA and
NICRA-associated organizations. These protests were ignored in the Northern Ireland
and UK governments for two years until they began to turn violent and were captured on
television and in pictures. One of the worst examples of a peaceful protest turning violent
occurred when an August 1969 Protestant Loyalist Apprentice Boys march in the
‘Bogside’ district of Londonderry elicited two days of rioting, including a Catholic
barricade of the Bogside district, and attacks by petrol bombs (Ibid, 13). Here, Catholic
nationalists protested the march through a traditionally Catholic area, and demanded that
the Apprentice Boys alter their plans. When the Apprentice Boys refused, citing their
own civil liberties to march peacefully and the longstanding traditional of marching in
that area, the Catholics built barricades to keep them out, which led to confrontation with
police. These Loyalist marches would serve as a constant reminder of the tensions
between nationalists and loyalists in Northern Ireland. Generally run by loyalists, their
stated purpose was to remember historic loyalist battles, though they often served as a
lightning rod by marching through traditionally nationalist streets. Marches through the
Bogside and other areas would often cause days of rioting after 1969, and were usually a
touchstone to determine the ongoing relationship between the loyalist and nationalist
parties.
Throughout these protests and calls for an end to institutionalized racism, the IRA
continued to exist, though in a much weaker role than it had held in the 1920s. The
‘Official’ IRA (OIRA) as it was termed in Northern Ireland, called for peaceful civil

30

disobedience, demonstrations, and electing members to the Parliament at Westminster
who would, over time, petition for a change to Northern Ireland’s status within the United
Kingdom.
The ‘Battle of the Bogside’, however, eroded the relationship between those
members of the OIRA who desired a peaceful revolution and those who wanted a more
military approach. The Provisional Irish Republican Army was born from those who left
OIRA to seek a more aggressive fight, and led by Ruari O Bradaigh, later replaced in
1983 by Gerry Adams. OIRA’s peaceful demonstrations and its seeming inability to
counter harsh British military campaigns and Protestant mob violence spurred the
dissatisfaction with OIRA. As Hennessey (1997) writes, slogans such as “…’IRA- I Ran
Away’ illustrated to many Republicans the inadequacy of [OIRA’s] response”. (171)
OIRA’s 1969 convention culminated in a vote where the hawkish elements determined
they required a military policy to uphold “…the basic Republican principle of Ireland’s
right to national unity” (ibid, 171).
The Provisional IRA (hereafter termed IRA) met in a 1969 Army Council to
determine military policy, advocating using the 1970 summer marching season as their
flashpoint. They aimed to use the Protestant marches through Catholic areas as a stepping
point for their own armed response. They advocated direct, military confrontation
through guerilla tactics, though acknowledged that their strategy was over the long-term.
The IRA’s Green Book, a combination manifesto and tactical handbook written in the
1970s, instructed new IRA members on both long-term goals, and practical matters, such
as using weapons and resisting interrogation. (English 2003, 213). The IRA reached back
to their predecessors’ role in the civil war, claiming that they were the only legal and
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lawful representatives of the 1918 Dail Eirann, the Irish parliament, and that as such,
were “…morally justified in carrying out a campaign of resistance against foreign
occupation forces and domestic collaborators” (Ibid, 214). As quoted in English (2003),
the Green Book stated that the IRA’s goals were based on:
(a) The right to resist foreign aggression; (b) the right to revolt against tyranny
and oppression; and (c) the direct lineal succession with the Provisional
Government of 1916, the First Dail [Parliament] of 1919 and the Second Dail
of 1921 (214).
The IRA used the 1970 marching season to train their members in guerilla tactics,
calling for all available resources to be used to create, arm, and train Northern IRA
members (Hennessey 1997, 173). While initially looking to ‘defend’ Catholic areas from
Protestant marchers, the IRA quickly went on the offensive, and on February 6, 1971,
shot and killed Gunner Robert Harris, the “…first member of the regular British army to
be killed in the current phase of the Troubles” (Hennessey 1997 175).
When presented with the growing concerns and protests of the 1960s and 1970s,
the Northern Ireland government initially called for a reconciliation approach, looking to
improve deprived urban areas, and appointing an independent board to oversee individual
grievances against local councils. (Hennessey 1997, 186). They even went so far as to
pass a universal suffrage act, and recommended that district councils and larger,
regionalized boards to control health, education, and other services replace traditional
local governments with gerrymandered districts (Hennessey 1997, 186). Despite these
calls for change, UK policy rarely succeeded to calming the violence, with the new Prime
Minister for Northern Ireland, Faulkner, declaring in 1971 that “… a more effective
enforcement of existing security policies was required, and to this end a small highpowered branch of the Northern Ireland Cabinet Office was established for the co-
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ordination of security policy and the servicing of the Joint Security Committee”.
(Hennessey 1997, 190). These security policies included sealing off nationalist roads,
conducting house-to-house searches, internment without trial, and violent anti-riot
measures which on occasional resulted in dozens of dead and hundreds of wounded (Bosi
2012, 358).
The UK government could no longer ignore NICRA and those seeking expanded
civil rights for nationalist Catholic groups. Rather than reaching out and negotiating an
expansion of those rights, however, the British army enforced a nationalist/Catholic
curfew from 1970-1973 in an attempt to break the IRA’s ability to fight. Also at this time,
the UK interned hundreds of innocent nationalists without trial under the Special Powers
Act, which served only to show them unwilling to negotiate (Shanahan, 2009, 13-14). Of
all the British pushbacks against the IRA, the 1972 ‘Bloody Sunday’, which resulted in
UK paratroopers killing 14 unarmed Catholic civil rights demonstrators, is perhaps the
foundational moment which drove much of the following UK-IRA relationship.
Faulkner’s military response to the IRA solidified the Catholic alienation from the
Government, as is evidenced by the growing level of violence in 1971. After the first six
months of 1971, 55 people had been killed in violent altercations, with over 300
explosions and 320 shootings, and 600 injured and receiving hospital treatment. As
Hennessey (1997) emphasizes, this level of violence was shocking for an area with only
one-and-a-half million people at the time.
Once the split between OIRA and the IRA solidified in the wake of harsh British
maneuvers such as Bloody Sunday, IRA leaders continued to adapt to the confrontation
settings in Northern Ireland, strategically using British pushback as ways to grow their
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own organization. For example, they used the internment under the Special Powers Act to
justify a new widespread bombing campaign against economic targets, where they had
originally only used selected bombings against military targets, with volunteers joining to
“… reclaim a sense of dignity, honor, and pride for themselves and for their community”
(Bew et al 2009, 350). Transitioning from bombing the traditional targets of state
repression (military bases, police stations) towards bombing civilian targets such as
unionist businesses and kidnapping/murdering unionist figures “…had the double intent
to making the presence of a government impossible in Northern Ireland by breaking the
will of Stormont [the Northern Ireland government building] and Westminster” by
directly impacting civilians’ daily lives (Bosi 2012, 358).
They also used the internment of prisoners to further educate and induct members.
Prisoners were grouped together in prisons, with nationalist and loyalist prisoners
separated from each other. By placing prisoners of one organization together and tightly
controlling their ability to meet members of the opposing side, prisons became ideal
places for IRA leaders to inculcate IRA members with IRA theory and tactics. The most
famous group of prisoners, the so-called ‘H-Block,’ often spawned future IRA leaders
such as Gerry Adams; prisoners were respected for their time in prison and held sway
over the broader membership. In fact, this sway was so large that when IRA leaders in the
early 1990s wanted to move to a less violent strategy, they required the approval of
prisoners to grant them the clout necessary to convince rank-and-file members.
While the IRA and British government engaged in an escalating military
dilemma, Protestant loyalists felt threatened by the ongoing violence and began arming
themselves into paramilitary groups such as the UDA (Ulster Defense Association) and
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the UVF (Ulster Volunteer Forces). These groups acted as quasi-military forces, often
receiving the tactic, if not outright, acceptance of the British government in their actions.
Yet again, the IRA adapted to the change, using the growth of loyalist paramilitary
organizations as another justification for their violent campaigns. For them, the growth of
these organizations meant that they had to protect themselves against yet another group,
and that more violent tactics were required. This steadily increasing violence combined
with Faulkner’s unwillingness to use political methods to resolve the issue, led to
stagnation in the peace process in the late 1970s and early 1980s. Faulkner believed that
the IRA was a terrorist organization and needed to be ‘put down’, as one would put down
a dangerous animal; for him, any political maneuvers to reduce violence and bring the
situation into a more acceptable forum would only mollify the IRA and convince them
that military action begat acceptance (Hennessey 1997, 198).

The 1980s-1993: Beginning to Change
The move from a perpetual system of violence to one of proscribing violence by
the IRA shows a momentous shift is what is considered ‘acceptable’ or ‘legitimate’. IRA
members, traditionally more militaristic and aggressive than other nationalist movements
such as the Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDP) led by John Hume, voted in a
party conference to accept allowing the ballot box as much influence as the armalite
(“Gerry Adams”). This succeeded only because IRA leaders continued to simultaneously
support the use of violence publically, despite Adams and Martin McGuinness believing
that the organization needed to move away from a sole focus on military tactics to an
emphasis on winning political representation (Feeney 2003, 334-335). IRA leadership
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initially viewed political maneuvers as a method of legitimizing the UK government as
the ruler of Northern Ireland, and therefore proscribed entering most political campaigns.
Despite this, they continued to maintain their link with Sinn Fein, especially at a local
level, though “[m]ost of the time, their electoral strategies are subordinated to the
terrorist’ more general strategy, based on violence.” (Criado 2011, 497). These strategies
resulted in Sinn Fein’s support eroding in the 1980s, as the population seemed to tire of
the violence aimed against civilians. As Bew et al (2009) write by the late 1980s, Sinn
Fein only received 11% of the vote, with SDLP receiving approximately 20%. (111) Sinn
Fein even encountered electoral difficulty in the Republic of Ireland, receiving only 1.7%
of the vote in 1987 (Feeney 2003, 336).
This coincided with the IRA leadership under Gerry Adams seeking for lines of
communications with other organizations, including more peaceful nationalist groups and
the British Government. This eventually evolved into ceasefires and the Good Friday
process, though the IRA continued to claim those were due not to declining public
support but rather war weariness and a weakening of the ‘no negotiation’ stance of the
UK government (Bew et al 2009, 116). This movement away from capitalizing on
immediate military wins, such as the over 10,000 shootings of the 1970s and towards a
focus on the ‘long war’ political campaigns, which meant using violence to slowly
weaken British resolve and help push them towards negotiating. (Feeney 2003, 338)
Again, in this way, policymakers’ fears of negotiating are in part supported. Here, Feeney
(2003) shows that IRA negotiation tactics may, in fact, have been driven by the desire to
gain legitimacy and therefore spread their belief system, the very thing that policymakers
do not want to occur. Despite this potential use of violence to drive negotiating, Feeney
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(2003) also shows that Adams wanted to tightly control the use of violence, using it only
as a threat, rather than the objective, and downgraded armed action as changeable tactics
that could be abandoned if the base of support desired more peaceful methods (Feeney
2003 342-343).
An initial move to introduce changes and bring peace through the Anglo-Irish
Agreement of 1985 opened the door for future negotiations, but produced little at the
time. Unionists claimed it gave too much influence to nationalists and the government of
the Republic of Ireland, while nationalists claimed that Unionist intransigence meant that
any outcomes from the proposed new style of governing with relatively equal
representation between the two groups would be stymied at all points. Understandably,
the 1985 agreement had little immediate impact on the peace process, though future
‘Framework’ agreements when then Northern Ireland Secretary of State Mayhew stating
that the government of the United Kingdom had little strategic, long-term interest in
Northern Ireland and would accept any outcome of a free and fair vote on whether
Northern Ireland should be reunited with the Republic (Coakley 2002, 25).
Despite having little immediate impact on the situation in 1985, the Anglo-Irish
Agreement and ‘Framework’ agreements from later years did set up a system of
negotiation and rules for entry into the political sphere for paramilitary group. Talks were
held on and off between 1985 and the 1997-1998 Good Friday talks, which was
accompanied by a “softening of attitudes and a willingness to reconsider standpoints that
had for long been regarded as sacrosanct” (Coakley 2002, 26). As Feeney (2003) points
out, much of this softening and the beginning of the talks began when Sinn Fein and the
IRA requested meetings with other nationalist organizations and the British government,
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starting in the late 1980s. For example, Sinn Fein initially proposed cooperation between
Northern political parties and the southern Republic (Feeney 2003, 386). The British
government initially refused to allow Sinn Fein to enter the talks in the mid-late 1990s,
due to their close association as the political spokesmen for the IRA, especially once the
IRA broke its original ceasefire in 1994. This caused conflict with the government in the
Republic, who had been attempting to bring Sinn Fein into the negotiation as a carrot for
trying to renounce violence (Feeney 2003, 394).

1994-1998: The Peace Process
A second factor leading to the GFA as an appropriate case study is the changing
views of acceptability and legitimacy in Northern Ireland politics. If, as policymakers
propose, terrorist groups should not be allowed entry to the political system for fear that
they and their violence will become legitimized as valid, then we should not see any
terrorist organization seated at a negotiating table. Yet, within a 10-15 year period, the
IRA moved from being proscribed to receiving that seat at the negotiating table. This
policy shift is underscored by the change in what is deemed acceptable – both for the IRA
and opposing forces. Here, the IRA moves from being deemed illegitimate and
unacceptable, as is evidenced by their continued role as an illegal movement and their
inability to enter political talks, to being deemed as an important representative of the
nationalist Catholic population. Both the UK government and the Mitchell Report
outlined the importance of including IRA representatives, even altering the terms of the
peace process to allow for paramilitary groups to retain their weapons during the
negotiations rather than demobilizing prior to receiving a seat as originally declared. As
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Todd et al (2009) show, a change in Northern Irish identity occurred in conjunction with
the IRA entering the political sphere, where younger generations of nationalist Catholics
have reduced their affiliation with a militaristic view of Irish identity and towards a
‘Northern Irish’ identity. Smithey (2011) concurs that identity changed in Northern
Ireland, as is evident by the lack of traditional loyalist graffiti and public symbols such as
flags, parades, and bonfires. As identity changes, so too does perception and writing
based off that perception. Here, I propose that the IRA’s entry into the GFA process will
accompany a change in their portrayal – towards a less violent, more legitimate portrayal
as policymakers fear will happen once terrorist groups are granted legitimacy through
their incorporation into the negotiations.
Ceasefires had been attempted before, to allow room for UK and nationalist
leaders to meet, often in secret, though none of them survived beyond a few years. The
first ceasefire in 1994 collapses in 1996, when IRA leaders claimed that the UK
government had reneged on its promises to resolve longstanding issues and proceeded to
launch one of the largest and most costly bomb attacks at Canary Warf, London. This
caused great consternation and distrust among non-nationalist groups, as they began to
wonder whether IRA leaders such as Gerry Adams were fully committed to the process,
and among nationalist groups as they wondered whether the loyalist and UK leadership
would be willing to negotiate on the sensitive issue of independence and home rule. The
violent end of this ceasefire resulted in violent summer marching seasons in 1997 and
1998, when the IRA again declared their final ceasefire in July 1998 in order to gain
entry into the proposed peace agreement talks that proscribed violent paramilitary groups.
For policymakers who fear that negotiating with terrorist groups will lead to a growth in
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terrorist attacks and the costs that accompany those attacks, the GFA provides an
example of how these groups can be incorporated into the system.
As Knox and Quirk (2000) write, negotiations such as those that occurred
between Sinn Fein and the UK government require a change in identity, where
fundamental beliefs about ‘who’ people are and ‘what they want’ remain the same, but
those are no longer defined as an us versus them mentality. (26) This identity dilemma, as
they call it, impacted the Good Friday process because in order to truly bring peace to
Northern Ireland, the IRA via Sinn Fein had to be included in the talks, but were still
defined as the ‘enemy’ and defined themselves as ‘freedom fighters’. To bypass these
conflicting identities, certain criteria had to be included. First, Sinn Fein, and therefore
the IRA, had to agree to nonviolence. Second, to manage IRA hardliners’ fears of
nonviolence making the IRA impotent, the British government agreed to a concurrent
decommissioning, rather than decommissioning prior to negotiation. This was directly
counter to their initial view that any negotiation organization had to completely disavow
violence, including demobilizing members and decommissioning weapons. Third,
confidence-building measures had to exist for both Sinn Fein/IRA and the British
government. Not only was Sinn Fein and the IRA required to put in place and maintain a
total ceasefire, but also the British government had to release political prisoners and relax
security measured. (Knox and Quirk 2000, 42-43) Contingent upon these three issues, the
IRA began a new ceasefire in August 1997, and were allowed a seat via Sinn Fein at the
negotiating table in September. While this did not end the criticism of the IRA by
unionist organizations, the UK government deemed the ceasefire acceptable, and
welcomed Sinn Fein as the IRA’s political representation, which meant that joint IRA
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and Sinn Fein leaders such as Gerry Adams were negotiating directly with Unionist
leader Trimble and the UK government.
Finally including IRA representation after the August 1997 ceasefire directly
countered international norms of who qualified as legitimate political actors. As Lanz
(2011) writes, international norms do not allow for the inclusion of “…people who
committed acts qualified as war crimes, crimes against humanity, [terrorism] or
genocide” into negotiations, due to the attempts to de-legitimize individuals or
organizations who would qualify as such so that they cannot gain support. (283-284)
Rather than continuing the view that the IRA should not be included due to its history of
violence as a terrorist group, and the relatively short time period between the August
1997 ceasefire and the September negotiations, we can begin to understand how changing
identities and views of acceptability and legitimacy on both sides of the negotiation table
were occurring. Lanz (2011) calls this the exclude-include scenario, where
…effective peacemaking requires the inclusion of an actor as a
consequence of its popular [domestic] support or military might. However,
such inclusion is problematic in terms of international norms because of
the stigma attached to groups using terrorism or being indicted for war
crimes. (289)

Representatives from the Unionist, Nationalist, UK Government, and Irish
Government had met on and off throughout the 1990s, with several meetings occurring in
early and mid-1997. It was during the summer of 1997, during the height of the
contentious marching season, when the UK government issued an ultimatum – the IRA
could either declare a ceasefire thereby joining the negotiations, or the UK government
would not include the IRA and their representatives in any negotiations, effectively
silencing their opinions and desires from the peace process. Since the IRA through Gerry
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Adams and Sinn Fein had been working towards preparing IRA members for the ‘long’
political war rather than the military episodes of the past, Gerry Adams declared the 1997
ceasefire as a return to the 1994 ceasefire which a “complete cessation of military
operations”. (“IRA cease-fire statement”). They announced it as their “…contribution to
the search for lasting peace…” though they remained “…committed to ending British
rule in Ireland.” (“IRA cease-fire statement”)
Leaders from Ireland, the UK and the US all commended Sinn Fein and the IRA,
with Irish Prime Minister Bertie Ahern acknowledging that “…any political ideal for the
future of Northern Ireland could only be realized by democratic means.” (“IRA cease-fire
promise”) UK Prime Minister Tony Blair congratulated the movement towards peace and
away from the use of terrorist tactics, but agreed with several Unionist leaders such as
David Trimble and William Ross that other groups suffered a severe lack of trust
regarding the IRA’s willingness to make the ceasefire permanent. As Hetherington
(2005) writes, trust in organizations, especially political organizations, is based on
outputs – is the organization delivering on its promises? Since the IRA had called off the
1994 ceasefire via the Canary Warf bomb, unionist leaders were understandably cautious
about whether or not the IRA would hold true to its word. On the other hand, the IRA
were understandably cautious about whether or not Unionist paramilitary groups would
finally be dealt with by the UK government, rather than being, at best ignored and at
worst utilized as an counter-terrorist force.
The Good Friday process itself was ripe with conflict between the organizations,
and nearly broke down several times, notably when certain unionist organizations felt
that the UK government was being too lenient with the IRA. The main issue at stake –
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whether Northern Ireland would and should remain a part of the United Kingdom – spoke
to the heart of the problem. For both Unionist and Nationalist traditions, selfdetermination was key, though the definition of ‘self’ differed. At the time, the majority
of Northern Ireland labeled themselves as ‘Unionist’ or ‘Protestant’, though the
‘Nationalist’ or ‘Catholic’ minority had a much higher birth rate and was rapidly catching
up with their Unionist neighbors. For Unionists, therefore, those determining whether
Northern Ireland ought to remain as part of the United Kingdom should have been limited
to only those people actually residing in Northern Ireland – thereby granting the Unionist
position a majority. For Nationalists, however, who believed that the isle of Ireland had
been illegally divided in the 1920s, every resident of the island should have been able to
determine the identity of Northern Ireland. With citizens of the Republic included,
Nationalists would have succeeded, and Northern Ireland would have been annexed into
the Republic. (Forsythe 2004, 216-217) Other contentious issues included the release of
political prisoners (whom Unionists called murders rather than political prisoners),
decommissioning and demobilization, representation in the Northern Ireland government,
and links between Northern Ireland and the Republic.
When scholars examined leaders during Good Friday Accords, they found that
certain leaders spoke relatively positively about the agreement, while others used
negative language. As my study examines the use of language as one measure of
legitimacy, the key is to understand that different sides viewed the Agreement and
participants in varying ways. For example, UK leaders such as Mo Mowlam and Tony
Blair used optimistic terms, while Unionist leaders such as Ian Paisley were relatively
negative. (Forsythe 2004, 221). Interestingly, Gerry Adams also ranked ‘negative’ in
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Forsythe’s (2004) study, showing a “lexical similarity [to Paisley]…[which] may be due
to similarities in the strident language and particular study of political discourse for
which they were recognized” (221). Further, Adams and Paisley in particular used
language focusing on symbolism and history rather than on the nitty-gritty of the
negotiation process (ibid, 221). This emphasis on symbolism, history, and culture serves
to establish an oppositional us/them mentality, thereby contributing to “…notions of
division, opposition and feelings of ‘entrenchment’”. (Muldoon et al 2007, 12). Yet if we
look at how people in Northern Ireland actually defined themselves before and after the
GFA in the Northern Ireland Life & Times Surveys, we find that social identity varied
depending on age, religious identity, and ethnic background. For example, as Muldoon et
al (2007) write, while only 3% of Protestants viewed themselves as ‘Northern Irish’ after
1986, 20% of Catholics did so. Further, they found that younger Protestants were more
likely to identify as “Northern Irish” than “British”, and that by 2004, 20% of Protestants
viewed themselves as “Northern Irish”, which 86% of them saying that this identity was
very important. (16)
We see here that identity remained important, despite changes away from an
us/them dichotomy, with Muldoon et al (2007) finding that among youth in Northern
Ireland, nationalist was fundamentally either Irish or British, regardless of a move
towards a single Northern Irish identity. Using symbolic language, therefore, can enable
politicians to evoke emotions from their constituencies that an analysis of the day-to-day
aspects of the Good Friday process would have overlooked. When unionist leader Paisley
publically confronted Sinn Fein’s Martin McGuinness, speaking of those “murdered by
his [McGuinness’] cohorts, the families that were torn apart, the people who were
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smashed and turned into vegetables by IRA violence” (Fletcher 1998), he reminds his
Unionist constituency of the harshest years of the Troubles, when between 200 and 400
people were killed each year. (Sutton, ND) He further evokes a sense of outrage at IRA
instability and untrustworthiness, as evidenced by the several canceled ceasefires of
1972, 1974, 1975, and 1994. On the other hand, when McGuinness responds by
suggesting that Paisley’s stance of disapproving the Good Friday Accords while speaking
out publically, meant that he was “…trundling into this room now because you’re afraid
you’re going to be left behind,” (Fletcher, 1998) signals to Nationalists that Paisley and
his supporters are using the Good Friday process merely to score political points, and that
there is little purpose in attempting a resolution with such as adversary.
Language therefore becomes important to understanding how groups view
themselves and others in society. If all members of the negotiation process speak
negatively and aggressively about the others, then we can assume that they feel
negatively about the other side. When one or more of those members are non-states in a
state-centered world, then we begin to question whether those members are even viewed
as legitimate actors. For instance, if Mowlam and Blair referenced Faulkner’s 1970s
views that the IRA had to be ‘put down’ and should not be included in a political solution
at all, then we would assume that they continued to view the IRA as illegitimate actors
seeking to overturn the legitimate political system. Should Blair have continued to call
the IRA and Sinn Fein “men of violence” as former Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher
did while heavily criticizing the Good Friday Accords in 1998, and suggested, as she did,
that such men “could never be brought into the peace process”, then we would continue
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to assume that the UK government viewed the IRA as illegitimate actors (McCartan,
1998).
If, instead, the UK government began referring to the IRA and Sinn Fein as
potential partners or colleagues, or, as Martin Fletcher reported on 4/11/1998, “…could
not wipe the smiles off their faces” after negotiating for months with Sinn Fein and the
IRA, then we can assume that a significant change in identity occurred at the
governmental level. I also draw attention to the more local level, understanding, of
course, the reciprocal nature between mass and elite beliefs. For example, while Blair’s
government issued mainly positive or neutral reports about Sinn Fein and the IRA’s
involvement in the Good Friday process, the IRA itself continued to remain divided on
the issue. As Fletcher reported on 5/1/1998, IRA leaders walked a fine line of approving
the Good Friday Accords while not outright rejecting the potential use of force and an
initial unwillingness to disarm. When questioned about this seeming inconsistency, Sinn
Fein chairman Mitchel McLaughlin stated, “We could have had a different statement
from the IRA [disapproving the Agreement] and we must welcome the fact that we
didn’t… Let’s not jump too many bridges at the moment” (Fletcher 5/1/1998). Here we
see the IRA’s concern with not only moving towards the Agreement, but also maintaining
its traditional identity of being against the UK involvement in Northern Ireland. This is
evidenced in the qualified way which IRA leaders such as Gerry Adams described the
Agreement. It was not the end-all solution to the long war, nor the best solution, but it
was a “basis for advancement” that, at the time, could not have achieved more for Sinn
Fein and the IRA. (Fletcher, 4/20/1998)
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Chapter 2: Methodology
How we speak about, and to, one another expresses underlying relationships. For
example, the way we choose to speak can express joy, admiration, and respect. It can also
indicate a lack of disbelief, anger, and frustration. The old ‘if you have nothing nice to
say’ maxim plays directly into this connection between beliefs and language. Perhaps or
fundamental than in-the-moment emotion is the basic belief in whether or not the other
person is valid and legitimate. Legitimacy, though difficult to define, is the basis of
whether we feel the other person to be acceptable, lawful, and tolerable. For many,
“words were seen to be of equal power…” to actions, with people deemed illegitimate
often seeking “…to refute or even appropriate the words and names used against them in
order to win the hearts, minds, and support (either tacit or active) of the population”
(Bhatia, 2005, 6).
For example, in a February 23, 2014, article on Bowe Bergdahl, an American
soldier held captive by the Taliban for five years, journalist Qadir Sediqi only once calls
the Taliban a terrorist organization, stating that the term is the US government’s choice.
He also quotes retired Major General James Marks as saying that the US has a history of
negotiating on the sidelines with such groups, though he does not refer to them as
‘terrorists’. Rather than continually terming the Taliban a terrorist organization, Sediqi
also calls it an insurgent group. Further, in labeling the Taliban as an insurgent group in
the 7th paragraph, and only using the term terrorist beginning in the 13th paragraph, we
can begin to understand how Sediqi uses rhetoric and language to subtly question
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whether the Taliban is, in fact, an illegitimate terrorist organization, or a more legitimate
insurgent group (Sediqi, 2/23/2014, CNN.com)10.
Legitimacy, “…is a critical problem for analysts because it often plays a central
role in conflicts between states and terrorist organizations; in these conflicts, each side
contests the other’s legitimacy… [L]egitimacy also confronts analysts with moral and
political issues that defy social scientific measurement. No statistical survey has yet been
devised that could adequately gauge the legitimacy of a state” (Cook, 2003, 108-109).
Due to the difficulties in conceptualizing and defining legitimacy, scholars often
use proxy variables that assess support, approval, and obedience. Critical Discourse
Analysis examines legitimacy of social institutions by using texts to view ideologies of
power, morality, truth, and rightness. As Fairclough (2001) writes,
Ideologies are closely linked to power, because the nature of the ideological
assumptions embedded in particular conventions, and so that nature of those
conventions themselves, depends on the power relations which underlie the
conventions; and because they are a means of legitimizing existing social
relations and differences of power, simply through the recurrence of ordinary,
familiar ways of behaving which take these relations and power differences for
granted (2).
If language can reinforce or alter ideologies, which serve to legitimize institutions
or behaviors, then examining how language is used can help us understand the legitimacy
of terrorist organizations. Fairclough (2001) continues when he writes that language is a
social practice both socially conditioned and part of society, and texts, whether verbal,
nonverbal, or written, are produced by that social interaction (19-20). The main point of
Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) is to look beyond the words to examine the deeper

10

Sediqi uses the term ‘terrorist’ one more time towards the end of the article, in a direct quote
taken from a supporter of no-negotiations policies. However, the quite does not specifically list
the Taliban as the terrorists; you are left to infer from Taliban as the subject from the paragraph
(2/23/2014, CNN.com).
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interaction between the language choice and socially accepted assumptions that
legitimize some groups or actions while delegitimizing others. In using CDA, scholars
must determine to the best of their ability (1) how the text’s parts link together and (2)
how the text fits into broader social interactions by looking for those hidden assumptions,
a process called ‘inferencing’. (Ibid, 67).
As Cook (2003) writes, it is often easier for states to use the media to legitimize
themselves, as they have access to resources which are often denied terrorist
organizations. She further elaborates by writing that, “a terrorist organization will need to
defend its claims to members of its own community as well as to members of the
international community” (124). Because of this, my study analyzes domestic and
international media to determine whether the narratives and assumptions of the terrorist
group’s legitimacy changes during the course of the negotiations. I examine these
changes quantitatively and qualitatively. The quantitative analysis examines media
portrayal to see if there is a broad change over time, while the qualitative analysis
examines smaller subsections of media reports to gain a deeper understanding of the
portrayal-legitimacy link at specific time periods during the negotiations. Both the
quantitative and qualitative analyses are discussed below.

Quantitative Analysis and Variables
Since Critical Discourse Analysis examines the intra- and intertextual
relationships of words and meanings, a qualitative analysis will analyze articles in depth.
It is also necessary to examine changes in the pattern of portrayals over time to view
possible overarching changes in legitimacy. All of the Quantitative variables are also
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examined in the qualitative analysis, but some of the qualitative variables have been
removed from the quantitative section. Rather, the quantitative analysis includes those
variables that can be quantified – namely word and phrase frequency counts. Critical
Discourse Analysis does not believe that analyses can be properly conducted by word
count alone; rather quantitative frequency counts and the qualitative examination of intraand intertextual analyses supplement one another.
The first variable examined in the quantitative analysis is ‘Case’, numbered 1-5. I
break my study up into 5 separate cases. The first case (July 1997) occurred prior to the
beginning of the peace process. Approximately half of that case was also prior to the
IRA’s 1997 ceasefire, during a very turbulent summer marching season. Marching
seasons often degenerated into riots as Protestant/Unionist organizations marched
through many Catholic/Nationalist streets to celebrate summer Protestant/Unionist
holidays and memorialize Protestant/Unionist military maneuvers.
Cases 2-4 occur during the peace process. Case 2 is September 1997, as the peace
process begins. Case 3 is January 1998, approximately halfway through the process, and
Case 4 is April 1998 at the end of the peace treaty process as negotiators finalized the
agreement. The final case, Case 5, is July 1998, after the process and as the different
groups begin to conduct votes on whether to approve or vote against the Good Friday
Accords. Since my main hypothesis is that the portrayal of the IRA will become more
positive during the peace process as they are gaining legitimacy, I expect ‘Case’ to have a
negative impact on negative portrayals and a positive impact on positive portrayals.
‘Newspaper’ is a dichotomous variable, with 1 as the Belfast Telegraph and 0 as
The Times (London). Since I also hypothesize that the domestic Belfast Telegraph will
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portray the IRA more positively due to their audience’s view of the IRA as a legitimate
actor, I expect that ‘Newspaper’ will have a positive relationship on positive portrayals
and a negative impact on negative portrayals.
The next groups of variables examine how different actors and actions are
portrayed positively, negatively, or neutrally. I examine portrayal of the IRA, Sinn Fein,
the peace process itself, and also when the IRA and Sinn Fein are linked in the article as
co-actors. If, as policymakers believe, negotiations legitimize the violent terrorist group,
then I expect to see that shown in the news articles’ portrayals relating to the IRA. I
examine these portrayals based on the words or phrases relating to those actors in the
articles.11 The list of words and phrases used is below.

Negative Terms/Phrases
Rape/Rapist/Raped
Kill/Killed/Killing/Killer
Murder/Murdered/Murderer
Terror/Terrorism/Terrorist/Terrorize
Fear
Loath/Loathed/Loathing
Lie/Lied/Liars
Revenge
Prisoner/Former Prisoner/Ex-Prisoner
Bomb/Bombing/Bomber/Bombed
Hunt/Hunts/Hunted
Blame/Blames/Blamed
Abandon
So-called
Will not negotiate
Attack/Attacks/Attacked/Attacking
Cruel/Cruelly

Positive Terms/Phrases
Joy/Joyful
Happy/Happiness
Peace/Peaceful
Calm/Calming
Hope/Hopeful
Applaud/Applauding
Courage/Courageous
Anti-Violence
Serious Negotiations/Substantive Negotiations/Full-Scale
Negotiations
Delicate
Praise/Praised/Praising
Ceasefire
Help the process
Secure
Euphoria
Good Faith
Inclusion/Inclusive

11

I only examine portrayals where the actor is clearly defined by its name. I do not examine times
when we may be able to infer an actor or action by the use of words such as ‘It’ or ‘Them’.
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Over-reaction
Shot/Shoot/Shooting
Feud
Explosive/Explodes/Exploded
Weapons/Weaponry/Weaponize
Combat/Combats
Rejection of Peace/Rejected Peace
Violence/Violent
Purported
Fail/Fails/Failed/Failure
Gangs
Kangaroo Court
Injustice
Fury/Furore
Hardliner/Hardliners
Threat/Threatens/Threatened/Threatening
Abduct/Abducted/Abduction
Shoot/Shot
Atrocity/Atrocities
Horror/Horrified
Tragedy/Tragic
Stand-off
Hopeless/Little Hope
Knife's Edge
Clash/Clashed/Clashes/Clashing
Hijack/Hijacked/Hijacks/Hijacking
Doubt/Doubtful/Doubts/Doubted
Struggle/Struggles/Struggled/Struggling
Falter/Faltering/Falters
Assassin/Assassinated/
War/Warred/Warfare
Turns Back On Peace/Turned Back on
Peace
Refuse/Refused/Refusal/Refuses
Enemy
No Confidence/Little Confidence
Disaster/Disastrous
Disorder
Troubled/Troubling
Faded Hoped/ Hope Failed/Hopeless
Fight/Fought

Keep option open
Abide by the talks
Keep their promise
In favour of talks
Optimism/Optimistic
Revive/Revived
Success/Successful
Respected/Respects/Respectful
Talks Resume/Resumption of Talks
Achieve/Achieves/Achievement
Necessary
Support/Supported/Supports
Justice
Burned the Candle/Worked Overnight/Worked Hard
Possible/Possibility
Worked Together
Confidence
Promise
Elation
Enthusiasm/Enthusiastic
Trust/Trustful
Encouragement
Comprehensive
Accord/truce
Reconciliation/Conciliatory
Honest/Honesty/Honestly
Integrity
Truth/Truthful
Equality/Equity
Reasonable/Reasonableness
Faith/Faithful/Faithfulness
Positiveness
Excitement/Exhilaration
Jubilee/Jubilation
Progress
Prosper/Prosperity/Prospers/Prospered
Victory/Victor/Victors
Triumph/Triumphal/Triumphs/Triumphant
Savvy
Good Fortune
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Trap/Traps/Trapped
Legitimate/Legitimacy
Danger/Dangers/Dangerous
Veracity
Bloodshed
Accurate/Accuracy
Anger/Angers/Angry
Vengeful
Fraught
Pain
Disillusioned/Disillusions/Disillusionment
Worse/Worst
Plot/Plots/Plotting
Insecure/Less Secure
Disarray

If a portrayal does not include the words listed on the negative or positive side, or
if it includes words from both in the same phrase or sentence, I count it as a neutral
portrayal. There may be times where we can infer a negative or positive portrayal based
on the words and phrases used, but that deeper understanding of the relationships is saved
for the qualitative section. Since I cannot include every possible words or phrase, I
included the most relevant words in the quantitative section12.
As mentioned previously, I assume that the IRA will be portrayed positively over
the course of the negotiations. The reasons for having different variables for the IRA,
Sinn Fein and the linked IRA/Sinn Fein is to determine which aspect of the organization
gains in legitimacy and experiences a change in portrayal. Since Sinn Fein is the
generally considered the political arm of the IRA, their portrayal will also indicate
changing public perceptions. For example, if the IRA is portrayed negatively while Sinn
Fein is portrayed positively, then I assume that the group’s violence is still deemed
illegitimate while their peace attempts and peaceful attributes are deemed positively. In
that case, the underlying disagreement with violence remains and the terrorist group has
12

Intercoder reliability was over 85% for all terms and phrases.
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not become legitimate. Rather, pacifist actors willing to engage in politics rather than
violence are granted legitimacy.
On the other hand, if the IRA rather than Sinn Fein is portrayed positively, then
we can assume that the terrorist group itself gained legitimacy during the negotiations.
This would support policymakers’ concerns about negotiating with those groups; namely,
that negotiations do indeed confer a certain level of legitimacy upon terrorist groups. If
this is indeed the case, then policymakers should be wary about negotiating with such
groups, as conferring legitimacy upon them could make terrorism a more attractive
option for certain organizations.13
‘Republican Terror’, ‘Loyalist Terror’, ‘Violence’ and ‘Murder’ are word counts
to further access the change in portrayal. If the IRA and Sinn Fein are deemed
illegitimate, then I assume that we will see more articles including the violent aspects of
the groups, namely their involvement in local violence and murders. ‘Republican Terror’
is a count of the number of times journalist called the IRA or Sinn Fein a terrorist group,
used terrorist tactics, or some variation of terrorist. ‘Loyalist Terror is a count of the
number of times Loyalist organizations were referred to as terrorists or using terrorist
tactics. I differentiate them so that I do not conflate the negative portrayal of the IRA or
Sinn Fein by using a simple count of the word ‘terrorism’ if the journalist was not
referring to them as terrorist. Since my main hypothesis is that the IRA and Sinn Fein
will be portrayed as more legitimate and positive over the course of the negotiations, I
13

There is, of course, a significant concern about measuring any legitimacy change during
negotiations. In order to enter the negotiations, the IRA had to begin and maintain a ceasefire,
which began mid-July, 1997. It is possible that any change in legitimacy during the ceasefire
came not from the negotiations, but from maintaining the ceasefire for over a year. If this is true,
then terrorism itself remains illegitimate, and any legitimacy changes come from the use of
peaceful means.
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expect the counts of these variables to decrease throughout the negotiations, as reporters
move their focus away from illegitimate violence and towards more legitimate, peaceful
descriptors.
Quantitative Methods14

14

In order to determine which statistical model to use, I first conducted histograms of the
different variables to determine whether a traditional OLS model would be appropriate. Since the
variables were counts of how often they appeared in each article, the variables were limited by
several external or structural constraints – length of article, the event/action being reported, etc.
This means that none of the variables were evenly distributed, and all included a majority of 0s
and 1s, with a left-leaning curve and a long, thin right leg.
For example, nearly all variables were uneven, such as the uneven distribution of the variable
‘IRA Negative’, which counts the number of times per article that reporters portrayed the IRA
negatively.
Most articles have between 0-1 negative IRA portrayals. We see similar graphs when we examine
other variables, such as ‘IRA Positive’, ‘Sinn Fein Neutral’, etc.
OLS regression residuals were also unevenly distributed, even when clustered by case. For
example, in Model 1 below, I measure the impact of several variables on the negative portrayal of
the IRA by both newspapers.
Model 1: IRA Negative
R2=.075
.332
Case
(.254)
-.421**
Newspaper
(.084)
-.004
Daily
(.003)
.087
SF Negative
(.063)
SF Positive
.123 (.2)
.022
Terror
(.053)
-.163**
Peace Positive
(.055)
.02
Peace Negative
(.057)
.042
Violence
(.022)
.155
Murder
(.097)
54.88
Constant
(38.11)
*=.1, **=.05, ***=.001
N=197
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Using Norris’ (1999) view of legitimacy as a multidimensional approach, diffuse
and specific support are measured by two different methods. Diffuse support, or the
support for the underlying ideals and beliefs about the organization, is measured via the
qualitative Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) is discussed at length below, and measures
underlying assumptions about ‘truth’, morality, and legitimacy. Specific support, or the
support for individual people or individual policies, is measured using a quantitative
approach. This is because word frequency counts are capable of illuminating changes in
perceptions over specific policy choices.
Tobit regressions were named for James Tobin’s 1958 article examining truncated
variables (Stewart 2009). Tobit regressions are modified probit models and generally
applicable when the dependent variables are truncated at 0 (Stewart 2009), though there
is debate among authors as to the appropriate regression method (Hamermesh 2009). For
example, Stewart (2009), reports that in some occasions, both Tobit and two-part
regressions provide highly biased marginal effects, especially as the amount of zero
observations increases. He prefers OLS regressions, suggesting that they can handle 0truncated variables with minimal bias. While his suggestions seemed applicable at first as
several of my dependent variables have large amounts of zero observations, I chose to
follow the method of Fi and Ajiboye (2010) in using Tobit analysis for my truncated data
after the very high OLS models’ skew tests.
The main difference between the original Probit and the modified Tobit analysis
is that in a Tobit, the value of y does not go below 0. In Probit regressions, y* is
For Model1, clustered by case to reduce standard errors, the Pearson’s skew test was .554 and the
Pearson’s Kurtosis was .992. Similar results occurred in follow-up models measuring other
dependent variables, such as the portrayal of Sinn Fein and the Good Friday Accords. Since both
of these are far higher than the preferred tests of 0, I chose to use Tobit analyses of the variables.
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unobserved, while the observed dummy variable y is 1 when y* is greater than 0 and 0
when y* is negative. Tobit analyses are used when the dependent variable cannot be
negative. Since Probit dependent y* variables are technically allowed to fall below 0, it
provides them with a wider range of outcomes. In my situation, words and phrases
cannot be negatively used – they either appear or do not appear. Since my dependent
variables cannot be below 0, the Probit model continued to skew the test results.
Due to the way my variables were constructed, all were truncated at the right side
as well as the left. For example, negative portrayals of the peace agreement were
truncated at a maximum of 7 mentions, as the histogram below shows, with the majority
being either 0 or 1. Since they were truncated at both sides, and only fell between 0 and
7, there is a highly limited range with which to work. This limited range means that a
Tobit was best able to manage the skewness and standard errors by providing the most
appropriate formula.
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Since my data sources are newspaper articles largely driven by external forces, I
conclude that a Tobit would be the most appropriate form of regression, as many of my
dependent variables will equal zero (Stewart 2009). As Stewart (2009) writes, “… the
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Tobit model assumes that the process that determines whether an individual engages in
an activity is the same one that governs how much time is spent in that activity” (12).
While this may not be true for some time diary data, it should be largely true for my data.
I anticipate that reporters will write in a certain way, and that the language choices they
make will be governed by the external events surrounding them. In this way, the same
processes that direct reporters to craft a certain amount of articles (i.e. legitimacy changes
due to negotiations) will also govern the linguistic choices authors make.
The general formula for a Tobit regression is as follows: y1*=x1B+e1, when
y1=y1* if y1>0 and y1=0 if y<=0 (Fi and Ajiboye 2010, 2523). As the latent variable, y1*
is the measure of legitimacy. Since legitimacy is such a vaguely defined concept (Cook
2003, Zarakol 2011) and cannot be measured quantitatively on its own, we measure
instead y1 as the observable variable – frequency counts of portrayal. In our Tobit
formula, x1 is the independent variables, B is the coefficients, and e1 are the errors. As Fi
and Ajiboye (2010) write, f(.) and F(.) are the density function and cumulative density
functions, which implies that “…observing a non-zero y are f(y) and p(y*<0)=F(0),
respectively” (2523). Provided both y* and e are normally distributed, which they appear
to be in my study (at least in the case of the error terms), outcomes can be expressed as
the density and cumulative density functions of a normal distribution. After conducting
the Tobit analyses, I also included analyses of the predicted probabilities to determine the
predicted outcome at different points of the variables.

Qualitative Variables and Methods
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The qualitative cases are randomly selected articles from the quantitative cases.
The reason for this is that while frequency counts can provide a large, overarching view
of how portrayal, and therefore legitimacy, may have changed over time, a qualitative
Critical Discourse Analysis of the articles requires a more in-depth reading. To account
for this, I chose at random 5 articles from each paper during each time period, for a total
of 50 articles. By limiting the qualitative analyses of the articles, I can focus more
intently on the assumptions, modality, and presuppositions of each article. The
randomness within each time period and newspaper still allows for an analysis of the
legitimacy changes over time.
All of the variables used in the quantitative section are also included in the
qualitative section of my study. They are, however, measured and viewed differently.
Rather than a simple frequency count of how often phrases are used in reference to a
specific actor or action, I also examine the deeper, underlying assumptions about truth,
‘rightness’, and morality in their relation to the legitimacy of the IRA, Sinn Fein, and the
peace process. While a quantitative account can provide a bird’s eye view of the timesseries data and can show trends among and between the two newspapers over the course
of the peace process, I use a qualitative assessment to gain a deeper understanding of
legitimacy at different points during the process. For example, a quantitative analysis
may show that the IRA is portrayed more positively, which would we expect if they gain
legitimacy, but a qualitative assessment can shed light on why they have been portrayed
differently, how they are portrayed in relation to other actors in society, and how the
reporters view any social changes.
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As such, the qualitative section is where I truly delve into the methodology of
Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA). CDA believes that deeply held thoughts on
legitimacy, truth, power, ‘rightness’, and other topics can be discovered when we
examine the articles’ words and phrases in light of their cultural meanings. As Bayram
(2010) writes,
language has a key role in the exchange of values in social life and
transforming power into right and obedience into duty. It may both create
power and become an area where power can be applied. Social values and
beliefs are the products of the institutions and organizations around us,
and are created and shared through language (27).
In understanding language, modality and assumptions become important
variables, as they point us in the direction of the writer’s beliefs. Take, for example, the
sentence “Men should pay for dinner when on a date’. Here, the common assumption is
that first, men date women. Rather than saying “The man who invites”, or “The man who
suggests dinner”, the simple phrase of ‘Men should’ assumes that (a) all men should pay,
and that (b) men only date women. (a) occurs because of the use of ‘Men’ as the opening
word in the sentence, rather than ‘Some men’ or ‘Sometimes men’ (b) occurs because if
the sentence meant that men who dated men should pay for dinner, then both parties
would engage in a tussle over who would pay. Also, if (b) were not the case, a qualifier
would be added, along the lines of ‘Men should pay for dinner when on a date with a
woman”.
Another assumption is that women cannot, or ought not, to pay for their own
dinners. This can be inferred from the word ‘should’ in the sentence. ‘Should’ belongs to
a group of words referred to as modal terms. Modal terms identify feelings of truth,
rightness, permission, obligation and power (Stillar, 1998, 35). Examples of modal terms
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are: “…can, could, may, might, must, ought to, shall, should, will, would” (Ibid, 35). As
Fairclough writes of modality’s ability to assign power and legitimacy,
This ‘critical’ view of ideology, seeing it as a modality of power,
contrasts with various ‘descriptive’ views of ideology as positions,
attitudes, beliefs, perspectives, etc. of social groups. Ideological
representations can be identified in tests… but in saying that
ideologies are representations which can be shown to contribute to
social relations of power and domination, I am suggesting that
textual analysis needs to be framed in this respect in social analysis
which can consider bodies of texts in terms of their effects on
power relations (2003, 9).

Modality, then, indicates when a writer wishes to assign, or detract, certain
attributes from actors or situations. The sentence ‘Men should pay for dinner when on a
date’ infers that it is right and proper for a man to pay for dinner, while not doing so
would be considered a serious faux pas. It also indicates a level of authority or power.
Here, the man is responsible for providing (paying), while the woman is responsible for
receiving (being paid for). If we extrapolate this modality out further, we can then assume
that men are, or ought to be, responsible for providing for women in a variety of ways,
and women ought not to provide for themselves. This suggests that women be ‘kept’, as it
were, and reliant upon the men in their lives to provide them with the necessities for
survival. Any man or woman who does not follow these rules therefore goes against
beliefs about the ‘proper’ role of men and women in society and would be subjected to
disdain and conflict. I conduct the same type of analysis on the articles’ modal terms,
looking for the assumptions and beliefs about rightness and truth as it relates to terrorist
groups and legitimacy. We can determine these underlying beliefs of rightness all by
examining the modal terms of the sentence. Modality’s importance in assigning power,
responsibility, and morality is one of the key ways which we understand a society’s belief
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system. There are also different level so modality. Words such as ‘are’ and ‘is’ indicate a
strong belief, while words such as ‘could’ and ‘may’ indicate a more tenuous belief. If
the IRA’s portrayal becomes more positive and legitimate over time, we may see articles’
modality regarding the IRA’s more violent aspects move away from the stronger ‘are’
and ‘is’ and towards the more tenuous ‘could’ and ‘may’.
Applying modality to the Good Friday Process allows us to understand the moral
beliefs of truth and rightness as they apply to the IRA and Sinn Fein. Take, for example,
the following sentence from a 7/24/1998 article about the Royal Ulster Constabulary
linking the IRA to the murder of Andrew Kearney: “Mr. Empey said people should
remember that Prime Minister Tony Blair’s pledges on the issue would come into place in
six months if the mechanisms linked to violence and decommissioning had failed”
(Connolly, 7/24/1998, Belfast Telegraph Online). First, Reg Empey was an Ulster
Unionist strategist, with the Ulster Unionists as one of the main opponents to the Good
Friday Agreement. The ‘mechanisms’ he referenced are the fact-checking included in the
recently concluded Good Friday Agreement to disallow any seats in the government to
organizations not following GFA-prescribed anti-violence and decommissioning
procedures.
The two italicized modal terms in the sentence – ‘should’ and ‘would’ – express
both the different levels of modality and the reporter’s underlying beliefs about the IRA’s
role in a post-GFA Northern Ireland. First, Kearney chose the quote from Reg Empey for
a purpose – for him, the quote held meaning and value. Second, the phrase “…people
should remember…” indicates that according to Reg Empey (as a representative of
Unionists) it is morally right that readers and citizens of Northern Ireland must keep in
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mind that violence will not be tolerated in the new government. It must be remembered,
however, that at this time Loyalist organizations were also involved in murders. Here we
have Reg Empey and the reporter focusing solely on the IRA as a violent organization
capable of murder, and telling readers that such violence ought not be tolerated. If
violence is therefore illegitimate, and the IRA continues to use violence, then we can see
that Empey and Kearney are showing the IRA as illegitimate.
Third, ‘should’ and ‘would’ are both on the stronger side of modality, though
‘should’ generally rates a higher level of certainty. Should indicates duty or propriety,
while would is used to reduce the bluntness of a statement. Therefore, while Empey and
Kearney wish us to be morally upset at the IRA’s violent action, the use of ‘would’ rather
than ‘will’ turns the sentence more conciliatory. Here, Empey and Kearney express their
distaste for the IRA and hope their readers will feel the same, while also attempting a
more mollifying tone about future actions. While reminding readers about the
unacceptability of violence, Empey and Kearney allow that future relationships between
the IRA and other groups may not be as bellicose as they were previously.
Another avenue to determine the nearly-hidden meanings behind words and
phrases is whether or not an article is written in a passive or active state. As Sornig
(1989) writes, use of the passive voice diminishes the credibility of the statement, or the
agency and authority of the object of the statement (102). For example, comparing a
statement such as ‘Harris wrote the paper’ and “The paper was written by Harris’ alters
how we view Harris’ relation to the paper. In the first statement (‘Harris wrote the
paper’), Harris is assigned primacy by being the subject of the sentence. In the second
version (‘The paper was written by Harris’), the subject becomes the paper. As the

63

subject in the active sentence, Harris gains importance and authority as the main actor.
When the sentence changes to the second, passive, version, Harris’ role is reduced, while
the paper becomes the primary and authoritative concern of the sentence. As Trew (1979)
writes, “Using the passive form removes the syntactic agency of actors, thereby putting
the ‘blame’ or ‘agency’ onto other actors” (98). Some sentences go so far as to remove
the main actor. For example, “The paper was written’ gives no information as to who
wrote the paper or why. Trew continues, “Looking at this in purely syntactic terms, with
the deletion of the agent there is no longer any direct reference to who did the action and
there is a separation of action from whoever did it. This is something that can only
happen if the description is in the passive form or some equivalent” (1979, 99).
If articles use the passive voice to refer to Sinn Fein or the IRA, we can assume
two different things. First, if the passive voice occurs in articles about terrorist actions,
then we can assume that the reporters are attempting to remove or lessen the IRA’s blame
for the action. This may occur if the reporters are attempting to make the IRA seem more
like a viable political actor, and therefore more legitimate. If, however, the passive voice
is used to refer to Sinn Fein’s actions in the negotiations, then we can assume that the
reporter is trying to reduce their agency as a viable political actor and make them less
legitimate. Passive voice matters, therefore, but in different ways depending on the
situation.
Along with modality and the passive/active divide, I analyze two other areas to
better understand societal views on legitimacy. First, I examine each article’s
backgrounding and foregrounding. Foregrounding works with the passive/active divide to
determine who is the actor and therefore who is important in each story. If an actor is
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foregrounded, they are highlighted “…for specific effects, against the (subordinated)
background of the rest of the text” (Wales 1984, 182). By highlighting certain actions or
actors, authors present subjects in specific ways to garner attention and feelings. For
example, the sentence, “Kyem prompted a campus lockdown and a massive armed
response from police by walking around with what appeared like weapons, including a
gun, while wearing tactical gear” (Owens and Dempsey 2013, paragraph 3). This
sentence comes from an article about a Central Connecticut State University (CCSU)
student who caused a campus-wide lockdown after wearing a Halloween costume around
campus 4 days after Halloween. In this sentence, Kyem is highlighted, as is his role in,
and responsibility for, the ‘massive armed response from police’ (Ibid). The sentence
foregrounds Kyem’s responsibility for the campus lockdown while backgrounding both
the fact that his outfit was a Halloween costume, and his reasons for wearing the costume
post-Halloween. Here, the foregrounded assumption is that Kyem desired to cause
trouble on the CCSU campus, and that the massive armed response was justified. The
sentence also backgrounds the larger, societal reasons that police may have become so
concerned – the wave of school shootings in the US in 2013. Nowhere in the article was
the larger social concerns with the 2012-2013 school shootings discussing, leaving the
reader to believe that the massive armed response was due solely to Kyem’s actions, not a
combination of Kyem’s actions and the earlier shootings.
In this article, the larger concern over the wave of school shootings has been
backgrounded. By backgrounding, authors minimize certain actors, making them less
important to society. Here, the responsibility for the lockdown rests solely with Kyem,
and not the backgrounded social fears over school shootings, or the larger social reasons

65

for those shootings. By minimizing those larger concerns and foregrounding Kyem, the
sentence, and the article as a whole, places blame solely on his shoulders. In our case, if
the IRA’s violent actions are foregrounded, while the larger social issues of social and
economic discrimination are backgrounded, then we can assume that the reporter is
attempting to place blame solely on the IRA. If instead the article includes an
understanding of the discrimination, while attempting to minimize the IRA, then we can
assume that the reporter is attempting to share the blame and responsibility and portray
the IRA as more acceptable by providing them with justifications for their actions.
Further, foregrounding an IRA bombing while backgrounding Sinn Fein’s role is the
negotiation is one way of making the IRA seem less legitimate, and vice versa.
Within backgrounding and foregrounding, assumptions and presuppositions
become integral in understanding power relations and legitimacy within texts and
discourse. Bayram (2010) writes that when presuppositions are embedded within texts,
audiences find it difficult to reject those views, and are therefore more easily persuaded
towards the author’s viewpoint (30). Because assumptions and presuppositions are
embedded to present a specific societal viewpoint, those representations can become a
discursive hegemony, where “…one discourse…holds sway over the way one talks about
or the way one understands a given reality, due to its perceived authority or popularity”
(Kalyango, 2011, 173). In his 2011 study, Kalyango found that CNN International news
reports contained presuppositions and assumptions which preferences non-African
stories, thereby reducing the authority, agency, and power of local African news.
The final area of qualitative analysis is a focus on the first paragraph of each
article. As Fairclough (1995) writes, reporters determine “what is included and what is
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excluded, what is made explicit or left implicit, what is foregrounded and what is
backgrounded, what is thematized and what is unthematized, what processes types and
categories are drawn upon to represent events… (104). Due to certain constraints of
newspapers (article size limits, reader attention span, selling papers via article titles, for
example), newspaper reporters use the first paragraphs to emphasize what they consider
to be the most important features of the stories. Van Dijk (1985) writes of first
paragraphs, “…[they] are used to build full macropropositions, to confirm (or reject) the
initial macro-assumptions of the reader and to further extend the macrostructure and the
model of the text” (84). Here, newspaper’s first paragraphs establish the main idea and
set the stage for truth, rightness, power, and other hidden assumptions, leading the rest of
the article and guiding the reader to confirm the reporters’ beliefs immediately. As such,
while I analyze the entire article qualitatively, I give primacy to the article’s first
paragraph. When analyzing quantitatively, however, I count all words as equally
important, regardless of their placement in regards to paragraphs.
The following two chapters will include the quantitative and qualitative analyses.
By using both methods, I aim to gain as broad a view as possible of any change in
legitimacy and public perception of the IRA and Sinn Fein. The quantitative analyses
allows me to determine any broad shift over time between the two newspapers and
populations, while the qualitative section helps to dig deeper into our understanding of
the perception of the IRA’s and Sinn Fein’s legitimacy.
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Chapter 3: Quantitative Findings
The contradiction between stated ‘no negotiations’ policies and actual action leads to the question
of whether or not concerns over talking with terrorists are valid. In this section, I begin to analyze
the portrayal of terrorist organizations to determine whether they gain legitimacy over the course
of negotiations. As such, my hypotheses revolve around legitimacy and portrayal in domestic
(Northern Irish) and target government/international (British) reporting.
Domestic Population (Domestic)
1a. After negotiations, the domestic population will view the terrorist group and its violence as more
legitimate, as measured by positive portrayal
1b. Before negotiation, the domestic population will view the terrorist group and its violence as more
legitimate, as measured by positive portrayal.
Target Government/Populations (International)
2a. After negotiations, the international population will view the terrorist group and its violence as
more legitimate, as measured by positive portrayal
2b. Before negotiations, the international population will view the terrorist group and its violence as
less legitimate, as measured by negative portrayal

By focusing on the Good Friday Accords of 1997-1998, I am able to follow a terrorist
organization (the Irish Republican Army or IRA) over the entire negotiation process. As such, I
include 5 time periods of analysis to capture portrayal and legitimacy and various points. The
periods, July 1997, September 1997, January 1998, August 1998, and July 1998, are discussed in
depth in the previous chapter. July 1997 was chosen to provide a baseline of legitimacy prior to
the negotiations to understand the IRA’s starting point in relation to domestic (Northern Ireland)
and international (United Kingdom) views of legitimacy and validity. September 1997 through
August 1998 are at various points of the negotiation process, which will allow us to determine
whether continued negotiations impact legitimacy. The final time period – July 1998 – is after the
conclusion of the negotiations and will allow us to determine whether there was a sustained
impact on legitimacy once negotiations have concluded.

68

Irish Republic Army (IRA)’s Portrayal
At first glance, it appears that Hypotheses 1b and 2b may be correct. A quick glance at
the proportion of articles with a negative portrayal of the IRA shows that The Times (London)
includes 22 more negative portrayals than the Belfast Telegraph. Chart A below shows these
results. The percentages may not add up to 100% due to rounding.
Chart A: IRA Negative Portrayals Percentages by Paper
IRA Negative
Newspaper: The
Newspaper: Belfast
Portrayals
Times (London)
Telegraph
0
28%
35%
1
47%
38%
2
16%
16%
3
4%
6%
4
5%
4%
5
0%
1%

When we briefly examine the portrayal over time, we also find some support for the idea
that negative portrayals decrease – Cases 3 and 5 both have fewer negative portrayals of the IRA
than their preceding cases, as shown in Chart B.

IRA
Negative
1
2
3
4
5
Total #
Negative

Chart B: IRA Negative Portrayals Percentages by Case
Cases:
1
2
3
4
52%
58%
78%
66%
32%
31%
17%
14%
0%
8%
0%
7%
16%
0%
4%
8%
0%
4%
0%
0%
25
26
23
29

5
60%
24%
16%
0%
0%
25

Based on these two charts, we have some support for our hypotheses. In order to
determine whether a probabilistic relationship exists, I ran Tobit regressions of 6 models:
positive, negative, and neutral IRA portrayal; positive, negative, and neutral Sinn Fein portrayal;
and positive, negative, and neutral portrayals of the peace process. The neutral portrayals are used
to provide a reference point to the positive and negative portrayals.
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Models 1-3 are the first Tobit analyses of the portrayal of the IRA. One of the first things
that we notice is that very few variables are statistically significant. In fact, ‘Case’ is only
statistically significant in Model 2 (IRA Positive Portrayals), while Newspaper, which measures
whether we are examining the domestic or international population, is not significant in any of the
models. We can therefore state that while a correlation may exist between case, newspaper, and
portrayals, it is not a statistically significant probabilistic relationship.
The first finding, that Case is only significant in the positive portrayals, and there has a
negative relationship, does not support our hypotheses that the IRA will gain legitimacy (as
measured via growing positive portrayal over time) during the negotiations. In fact, it appears to
be the opposite. While we cannot posit a relationship in Model 1 (IRA Negative Portrayal) and 3
(IRA Neutral Portrayal), we can see that as time elapsed over the course of the negotiations, the
newspapers were less likely to portray the IRA positively. Since all of our hypotheses suggest that
the IRA will gain legitimacy over the course of the negotiations, we can begin to question the
assumption that including terrorist groups in negotiations with state governments grants political
legitimacy. While we cannot say that negotiations with terrorists groups make portrayals more
negative, it does not appear to make them more positive. Therefore, the basic assumption that
negotiating with terrorist groups will make those groups more legitimate may be based on a
flawed understanding of how legitimacy is created.
If negotiations reduce the positive portrayals of the IRA, it may be due to the IRA’s
ceasefire. The IRA instituted a ceasefire in July 1997, and held it through the end of the
negotiations despite occasional reprisal/punishment beatings. Despite this ceasefire, punishment
beatings still occurred, as did the occasional bomb threat. These, plus the entry to the IRA into the
political sphere may have led to a decrease in their positive portrayals – they could have been
seen as ‘flouting’ the non-violence requirements for entry into the Agreement negotiations, or
reporters may have been concerned about moving too quickly towards the pro-IRA bandwagon.
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It is also possible that as the negotiations evolved and Northern Irish nationalists became
more amenable to a possible peace agreement, the very thought of the IRA as a violent
organization (the traditional view of the terrorist group), became the predominant view amongst
nationalists rather than any potential social benefits that the group may have provided. If this is
the case, then the IRA would not gain legitimacy; rather the peaceful political activities of Sinn
Fein would be preferred.
Models 1 and 2 show the negative and positive portrayals, respectively, and Model 3 is
used as a reference point for those portrayals.

1 (IRA Negative
Models: Portrayals)
Case
Newspaper – Belfast
Telegraph
Sinn Fein
Negative Portrayal
Sinn Fein
Positive Portrayal
IRA/Sinn Fein
Negative Portrayal
IRA/Sinn Fein
Positive Portrayal
Peace Agreement
Negative Portrayal
Peace Agreement
Positive Portrayal
Republican Terrorism
Loyalist Terrorism
Violence
Murder
Constant
N:
Psuedo R2:
Log Likelihood:
Sigma

2 (IRA Positive
Portrayals)

3 (IRA Neutral
Portrayals)

.021 (.087)

-.636** (.208)

.16(.202)

.011 (.224)

-.148 (.44)

-.105 (.508)

-.059 (.132)

-.282 (.247)

.126 (.29

-.1 (.22)

.833** (.375)

.774* (.464)

.162 (.155)

-.4525 (1.208)

.079 (.351)

.577 (.623)

.290 (.213)

.69 (1.42)

-.0712 (.076)

.130 (.142)

.079 (.169)

-.238* (.134)
.539* (.299)
.147** (.069)
.05 (.118)
-.094 (.086)
-11.732 (.)
-.737 (.315)
-.294** (.227)
.095 (.086)
-.236 (.227)
.737** (.315)
-.555(.59)
186
186
.1679
.162
-274.44259
-114.62743
1.389522 (.094)
1.9 (.279)
*=.10, **=.05, ***=.01

.206 (.281)
.301* (.154)
-2.04 (1.35)
.293* (.169)
-.175(.202)
-30.603 (37.05)
186
.027
-329.72139
3.068 (.228)
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The second major finding related to our hypotheses is that population, whether domestic
or international, is also not significant in any of our first three models. All of my hypotheses
stipulated that there would be a difference in views of legitimacy between the domestic and
international populations. This occurs due to the differences between specific and diffuse support
and legitimacy, where we assumed that the domestic population would be more willing to view
the local terrorist group as legitimate due to the history of the IRA supporting certain areas, or at
least being involved in those areas in measurable ways – social insurance, supporting
desegregation, etc. Of course, we must be aware that there may be a measurement flaw in truly
understanding the differences between the two populations.
In this study, the domestic population is measured by the reporting of the Belfast
Telegraph, the most widely circulated newspaper in Northern Ireland, while the international
population is measured by the reporting of The Times (London), the most widely circulated
newspaper in Britain. While these two newspapers may, in fact, measure the differences between
the Northern Ireland and Britain, choosing the Belfast Telegraph means that I have included
Republicans and Loyalists into the same domestic category, even though they have very different
views of the IRA and the IRA’s role in Northern Ireland’s society.
Aggregating these two groups occurred because the only way to measure support in
Northern Ireland vis-à-vis media portrayal would be to analyze two different news sources within
Northern Irish life – a Republican source, and a Loyalist source. I intentionally did not use this
route because the main Republican news source, An Phoblacht/Republican News, is directly
linked to the IRA, with a “…long and historic association with the Republican Movement…”,
with several editors and reporters moving back and forth between An Phoblacht and Sinn Fein
and IRA leadership (NA. ND. “About Us”).
Had I used An Phoblacht as a news source, regression results would have been skewed
pro-IRA due to the newspaper’s strong and longstanding links with the organization. Further, had
I instead used a pro-Loyalist news source, our regression results would have been automatically
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skewed anti-IRA, and would not have allowed us to gain a true understanding of how the entire
domestic population felt about the IRA during the negotiations. While the Belfast Telegraph may
not give us a perfect analysis of how the domestic population felt about the IRA (especially
considering that the Northern Irish population was divided over the role of the organization), it
was the second-best option.
When we examine surveys and polls leading up to the negotiations, we do see a dramatic
difference in approval ratings amongst Catholic/Republicans and Protestant/Unionists. For
examine, the 1997 Social Attitudes in Northern Ireland: Sixth Report shows a considerable
difference in perceptions of prejudice against Catholics, with 83% of Catholics and only 59% of
Protestants believing that prejudice against Catholics still existed in Northern Irish society (N.A.
1997. “Social Attitudes in Northern Ireland”). However, it should be noted that in the same
survey, only 8% of working class Catholics reported Sinn Fein as their political party
identification, while 48% of them report identifying with the SDLP (Ibid), another Republican
political party, but one that did not support, or engage in, violent tactics. This is one of the main
reasons why I chose to use the Belfast Telegraph, rather than attempting to disaggregate the
Northern Irish domestic population into Republican and Unionist groups; if even the working
class Catholics – the traditional core of Sinn Fein and IRA support - are not supporting Sinn Fein
and the IRA, then there may be far fewer deeply held differences of belief between Unionist and
Republican populations in the 1990s.
From this vantage point, we can begin to question whether negotiations do, in fact, bring
legitimacy to a terrorist group and whether policymakers should fear those negotiations15. Our
findings so far seem to indicate that those fears may be based on an unfounded assumption of
how legitimacy is granted to different organizations. Despite concerns over aggregating the
domestic population in Northern Ireland, we see that the IRA does not appear to gain in positive
15

Negative and Positive portrayals are analyzed in relation to Neutral coverage. As such, only the
Negative and Positive portrayal models will be analyzed, though I included the Neutral models
for reference’s sake.
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portrayals due to the negotiation process. There is, however, a caveat as to when the IRA may, in
fact, be portrayed as more positively – when linked with the Sinn Fein in a positive manner.
Only two of our variables in Model 1 are statistically significant – ‘Peace Agreement
Positive’ and ‘Republican Terrorism’. In ‘Peace Agreement Positive’, the IRA is portrayed less
negatively, while ‘Republican Terrorism’ is more likely to portray it negatively. This may occur
for a variety of reasons, some of which will also be discussed in the following qualitative chapter.
First, referencing Republican terrorism and derivatives of the word ‘murder’ may be meant to (a)
remind readers that violence was not far in the past and could resurface at any moment, (b)
emphasize a lack of change for the IRA, especially as it continued a ceasefire while allowing
certain punishment beatings and reprisals, or (c) threatening a return to violence should the peace
agreement ultimately fail.
In (a), reporters appeared to include negative certain paragraphs or entire negative articles
after several days of neutral or positive IRA coverage. For example, some cases included several
days of positive or neutral IRA coverage, but then also included a section or article about a
punishment beating, a remembrance ceremony for a prior attack, or a continued court case
regarding an IRA-linked murder or killing. While I cannot assume that the reason for these
sections or articles was due solely or even mainly to reminding readers of the IRA’s violent past,
we should remember that the IRA had only recently (July 1997) issued its final ceasefire and had
broken the previous ceasefire (1994) with a massive bombing at Canary Warf in London. The
violent end to the previous ceasefire combined with the relative newness of the 1997 ceasefire did
not leave much time for a public ‘forgetting’ of past offenses, where old actions and tactics may
become tacitly overlooked or disremembered in an attempt to bring social forces back together
after violence (Vivian 2010, Coman et al 2014).
Continuing with the theme of public/communal forgetting, it is also possible that the role
of discussing republican terrorism may be to also emphasize the lack of change in the IRA’s
tactics. Throughout the negotiation process, the IRA continually refused to demobilize and disarm
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their forces, stating that it was not advantageous to disarm in light of their long-term end goal- the
removal of British government from Northern Ireland and reunification with the Republic of
Ireland (Heyck, 2000). As Heyck (2000) writes,
…[i]t is important to remember that peace has never been the
objective of the IRA… Peace and devolved government…are to the
IRA, at best, means to an end…IRA leaders believe they were not
defeated in this conflict [against Northern Irish and British security
and paramilitary forces], but simply agreed to a truce (or cease-fire)
in order to test the possibility that they might get what they want by
negotiation rather than war.”
When the IRA did eventually disarm, it was not until September 25, 2005, 7 years after
the end of the Good Friday Agreement and two months after the 7/7/05 non-IRA-related London
Bus Bombing (Creegan 2005). Disarming was such a hot-button issue for delegates and
traditional militant members of the IRA that the Mitchell Agreements had to take into account a
radical new idea in conflict negotiation – that disarmament could occur during, or even after,
political discussions. Prior to this, disarmament and demobilization were seen as key confidencebuilding steps in conflict resolution.
Therefore, it is possible that reporters, understanding the newness and tenuousness of the
IRA’s ceasefire and Sinn Fein’s representation in the GFA negotiations desired to remind readers
that violence was only a few steps away at any moment, and that the IRA could revert back to
their previous violent tactics despite their non-violence pledges. It is also possible, as (c) states,
the focus on Republican terrorism and murder increasing the IRA’s negative portrayals was not
necessarily meant as a blow to the IRA’s credibility, but rather as a stark reminder that any
violence could reoccur if the peace agreement process failed. The negative portrayal of the IRA
may have only been secondary to the true purpose of references to republican terrorism and
murder, with the main purpose being to reinforce the idea that peace, from all sides, was
necessary to reintegrate Northern Irish society and create a stable, lasting non-violent
arrangement. Unfortunately, it is not possible at this time to understand fully the main reasons
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being Republican terrorism and murder leading to higher IRA negative portrayals, but any of
these three suggestions are possibilities.
Now that we have discussed possible reasons for a negative IRA portrayal in Model 1,
there is one final significant variable that may lead credence to the idea negative IRA portrayals
reminding people that peace is important. The ‘Peace Agreement Positive’ variable posits a
negative relationship, mainly that the more often the peace agreement was portrayed positively,
the less likely the IRA is to be portrayed negatively. This serves to reinforce the belief that
reporters and society were recognizing the importance of maintaining negotiations and a lasting
peace, and that as that recognition progressed, a type of public forgetting about the IRA occurred
as a necessary measure to allow the IRA’s delegates entry into the political sphere.
We see similar relationships in Model 2 (IRA Positive Portrayal). Model 2 contains 4
significant variables – ‘Case’, ‘Sinn Fein Positive Portrayal’, ‘Peace Agreement Positive’ and
‘Violence’. This is the only model in which Case is significant. Here, the negative relationship
shows that over the course of the negotiation process, the IRA becomes portrayed less positively.
This subtracts credence to my hypotheses that negotiations inherently confer legitimacy upon
terrorist groups, and is shows graphically below.
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Cases

Fitted Values of IRA Positive Portrayal By Case

Here we see the opposite: as the negotiations progress, positive IRA portrayals decrease.
This could be due to the same (a) and (b) reasons listed above – namely that violence could
resurface and the IRA could not yet be trusted.
In Model 2, however, we do find two instances that appear to lead the IRA to gain
positive portrayals. In the first, ‘Sinn Fein Positive’, we see that reporters occasionally relate Sinn
Fein’s portrayal with the IRA’s portrayal. This occurred most frequently as reporters would
discuss IRA and Sinn Fein delegates to the negotiations. Technically, as a paramilitary/terrorist
organization, the IRA could not directly enter the negotiations. Their long and strong links to
Sinn Fein, however, allowed for Sinn Fein delegates to represent the IRA at the negotiations –
and IRA and Sinn Fein leadership frequently rotated back and forth. Gerry Adams, for example,
has been president of Sinn Fein since 1983, and represented Sinn Fein at the negotiations and as
its member of Parliament. And, though he denies being a member of the IRA, has been named as
a key member of the High Council, was frequently a speaker at IRA conventions, and has been
investigated for his possible role in ordering the murders of several people by the IRA, including
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Jean McConville. It is not the direct linkage between IRA and Sinn Fein that seems to lead to a
more positive portrayal, but the more subtle positive mention of Sinn Fein within the IRA-centric
article.
When reporters link the IRA and Sinn Fein positively in Model 2, we see the likelihood
of a positive IRA portrayal increase. This may occur for two reasons. First, when discussing the
role of delegates in the negotiations, reporters and society wish to emphasize the positive to show
that previously violent organizations were moving away from violence and towards a peaceful
political sphere – an important step in conflict resolution strategies. Second, it is also possible
that, despite the IRA’s positive portrayals increasing, the true relationship is that Sinn Fein, as a
peaceful political actor, is driving the portrayal. It could be that Sinn Fein is gaining legitimacy,
and pulling the IRA’s portrayal along with it. For this reason, I also analyze Sinn Fein’s
legitimacy separately to determine what can drive its portrayal.
The second time in this model that we see the IRA’s positive portrayals increasing occurs
when the peace agreement is discussed positive. Here, the more the peace agreement is discussed
positively, the more likely we are to see positive IRA portrayals. I believe that this is due to the
IRA’s ceasefire, which lasted the entire length of the negotiation as well as the growing role of
loyalist groups in stagnating the process while the IRA appeared to push for an agreement. This
may also be early attempt at the communal forgetting mentioned previously: as the IRA supports
the Agreement by remaining relatively peaceful during the ceasefire, so the IRA’s past actions
may begin to be forgiven, if not truly forgotten.

Sinn Fein’s Portrayal:

Case

4 (Sinn Fein Negative
5 (Sinn Fein Positive
Portrayals)
Portrayals)
-.133 (.311)
-.086 (.189)

6 (Sinn Fein Neutral
Portrayals)
-.388 (.284)

Newspaper- Belfast
Telegraph

.613 (.72)

.273 (.675)

Models:

.878** (.439)
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IRA Negative
Portrayals

-.0018 (.351)

-.037 (.197)

-.068 (.319)

IRA Positive
Portrayals

-.498 (.612)

.703** (.31)

.169 (.546)

IRA/SF Negative
Portrayals

.4452 (.396)

.19 (.281)

.692 (.445)

IRA/SF Positive
Portrayals

4.242** (1.572)

.963(.951)

2.03 (1.63)

Republican Terrorism .052 (.237)

.176(.121)

.093 (.209)

Loyalist Terrorism

.121 (1.7)

.19 (.985)

.296 (1.49)

Peace Agreement
Positive Portrayals

.827** (.381)

.481** (.22)

.77** (.37)

Peace Agreement
Negative Portrayals
Violence
Murder
Constant
Log Likelihood
N
Psuedo R2

.281 (.219)
-.045 (.263)
-.134 (.298)
-4.151** (1.368)
-112.96015
186
0.0890

-.091 (.144)
-.228 (.176)
-.075 (.188)
-2.38** (.804)
-283.55052
186
0.0394

.240 (.221)
-.12 (.242)
-.12 (.265)
-.397 (1.08)
-283.55052
186
0.0394

Sigma

3.1 (.506)

3.89 (.356)

3.887 (.355)

*=.10, **=.05, ***=.01

When we examine how Sinn Fein is portrayed, we quickly see that there are few
variables which are statistically significant, and nearly all occur in Model 5, Sinn Fein’s positive
portrayals. Therefore, we cannot posit a probabilistic relationship between the most of the
variables and Sinn Fein’s negative portrayal.
In Model 4, two variables are statistically significant – ‘IRA/SF Positive Portrayals’ and
‘Peace Agreement Positive Portrayals’. Both lead to a higher likelihood of negative Sinn Fein
portrayals. Neither ‘Case’ nor ‘Newspaper’ is significant, except for ‘Newspaper’ in Model 5,
which may mean that any change in the IRA’s portrayal is not due to a change in Sinn Fein’s
portrayal.
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It runs counter to common wisdom that an increase in the linked ‘IRA/SF Positive
Portrayals’ increases Sinn Fein’s negative portrayals. I expected to see a negative relationship for
this variable, where an increase in positive portrayals of the joined IRA and Sinn Fein leads to a
decrease in Sinn Fein’s negative portrayals. The only reason that I can posit is that as Sinn Fein
leaders are seen to be leading the IRA in a peaceful manner, the party as a whole is criticized for
their role in tacitly supporting past IRA abuses.
The second significant variable is the positive portrayal of the peace process, which is
also not expected. Here, as positive portrayals of the peace agreement occur, Sinn Fein is more
likely to be portrayed negatively. This may be due to the fact that as the negotiations commence,
there are times when Sinn Fein is seen as obstructing the process. Certain articles portray the
party as demanding special concessions, while Unionist parties get ignored.
In Model 5, Sinn Fein’s positive portrayal, 3 variables are both significant and positive,
leading to an increased likelihood of positive portrayals. This is the only Sinn Fein model that
maintains a significant relationship for ‘Newspaper’. Here, the Belfast Telegraph is more likely to
portray the party in a positive manner. This is similar to what was expected in Hypothesis 1b, that
the domestic audience will have a more positive view of Sinn Fein and the IRA. I graphically
demonstrate this relationship below, by plotting the fitted values of ‘Newspaper’ against Sinn
Fein’s positive portrayal.
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Newspaper

Fitted Values of Sinn Fein Positive Portrayals

We also see that as positive portrayals of the IRA increase, so too do positive portrayals
of Sinn Fein. This is counter to Model 4, where an increase in positive portrayals directly linking
Sinn Fein to the IRA leads to an increase in negative Sinn Fein portrayals, but similar to Model 2,
where an increase in Sinn Fein’s positive portrayals led to an increase in the IRA’s positive
portrayals. This may again be accessing a subtle link between the IRA and Sinn Fein, rather than
the more direct, explicit direct links.
The final significant and positive variable is ‘Peace Agreement Positive Portrayal’. This
is also as expected; as the peace agreement is portrayed positively, so too is Sinn Fein. Since the
majority of the variables leading to an increase in Sinn Fein’s positive portrayals are related to the
IRA and the peace process, we can begin to see that there may be a link between the negotiation
and legitimacy, though not necessarily the hypotheses I initially posited.
If we examine our hypotheses on the whole, we begin to dispute policymakers’ fears
about increasing legitimacy through negotiations. ‘Case was only statistically significant once,
and in neither case did it positively impact the IRA or Sinn Fein’s portrayal. Further, audience –
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domestic or international – does not appear to matter. ‘Newspaper’ was significant in Model 5,
the positive portrayal of Sinn Fein. There, the Belfast Telegraph led to an increase in positive
portrayals, but there is no link in this study between newspaper audience and negative or even
neutral portrayal. I posit that this distinction between The Times (London) and the Belfast
Telegraph occurs because the readership of the Belfast Telegraph lives with Sinn Fein on a daily
basis. They experience both the positive (social welfare, interest aggregation and articulation,
etc.) aspects, as well as the negative (IRA apologists). Londoners, on the other hand, may only
know of Sinn Fein through their role as representatives of the IRA. Since their only experience
with the IRA is negative – the Canary Warf bombings, the 1984 Brighton Hotel bombing, and the
1979 murder of Lord Mountbatten, for example – any associate of the IRA must, therefore, be
guilty by association.
‘Case’ and ‘Newspaper’ were the two main aspects of the hypotheses – that (1) time
elapsed during a negotiation and (2) domestic audiences would lead to a higher legitimacy as
measured via portrayal. Since in most models, neither one of these variables were statistically
significant, we cannot posit a probabilistic relationship between the variables in support of our
hypotheses.
We can, therefore, say that our hypotheses are not supported by this study. First, each
hypothesis stated that their audience would increase its views on the IRA’s legitimacy. In nearly
every model, this was uncorroborated. The negotiation did not appear to influence the IRA’s
legitimacy by increasing its positive portrayal, nor did it increase Sinn Fein’s positive portrayal.
Second, the hypotheses differentiated between domestic and international audiences. I
stated that domestic audiences, due to their daily interaction with the IRA often beyond the
violent tactics, would begin and end with believing that the IRA enjoyed higher levels of
legitimacy. International audiences, whose only experience may have been that of a physical
attack and not of the occasional social welfare benefits of an organized terrorist organization, may
have a more negative view of terrorist organizations.
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In this study, I find that audience, as measured by the domestic Belfast Telegraph versus
the international Times of London, does not impact the portrayal of the IRA. Since ‘Newspaper’
was only significant in Model 5 (the positive portrayal of Sinn Fein), we can say that living
amongst the terrorist group does not appear to have a relationship with views on legitimacy.
Further, having your only experience with that group as being attacked, which I hypothesized
would make legitimacy less likely but still achievable, is not supported.
From these statistical analyses, we can now say that there does not appear to be a
relationship between negotiations and legitimacy. However, it should be noted that there may be
misconceptualizations that constrain our ability to observe a relationship. First, conceptualizing
‘legitimacy’ is difficult, and measurement by portrayal is certainly not the best-case form of
measurement. Huntington (1991) called legitimacy a “mushy concept that political analysts do
well to avoid” (46). Legitimacy, or the belief that an individual or organization is right, true, and
acceptable and can wield power acceptably (Gilley 2006), can be measured inexactly by such as
variables such as approval ratings, ideological equity, consent and justification (Beetham 1991)
constitutional requirements, political processes (Mellers & Baron 1993), and protest movements.
Since there is no cross-national measurement on legitimacy of states (Gilley 2006), the
foundational characters of the current international system, we can understand why there is not a
cross-national data set regarding sub-state actors such as terrorist groups.
As a ‘mushy’ concept, measuring legitimacy is tricky, to say the least. I conceptualize
legitimacy as media portrayal, with the assumption that illegitimate actors will be portrayed
negatively to reflect their illegitimacy, while legitimate organizations will be portrayed positively.
In measuring portrayal, the quantitative aspects of my study use a word or phrase count. It may be
that this imperfect measurement could be improved by quantified a more conceptual analysis of
portrayal, such as whether an entire paragraph appears positive or negative as used by Johnson,
Boyer & Brown (2011), rather than a word count.
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While word counts can help illuminate how reporters reference groups and organizations,
it does miss a certain complexity that is difficult to quantify. Word counts are used by discourse
analysts, but the Critical Discourse (CDA) branch generally decry that methodology as
inadequate as a deeper understanding is necessary to fully fathom the underlying power
relationships. For example, while the word ‘violent’ may be used multiple times leading a word
count analysis to view the article with a violent tone, a deeper understanding may in fact show
that while the world is used, it was used to describe the end of violence and the rebuilding of
peaceful relationships.
For this purpose, the following chapter uses CDA to examine a randomly chosen subset
of the articles in this quantitative chapter. It looks for hierarchies to show power relationships,
modality to show ‘rightness’ and ‘truth’, and how word choices and placement can emphasize or
de-emphasize (foreground or background, respectively) organizations. Though we could not see a
statistically significant relationship between the negotiation process and legitimacy via the word
counts, a CDA view may in fact shed light on links between portrayal, legitimacy, and
negotiations with states.
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Chapter 4: Critical Discourse Analysis
Findings
Despite not finding statistically significant results regarding a link between audience,
negotiations, and legitimacy, I did see trends occurring. Though I cannot show a probabilistic
relationship, a deeper analysis of articles during the negotiations appears to show there may be a
connection between negotiation and legitimacy. Unfortunately, however, it is not the relationship
I predicted in my hypotheses.
When examining the cases using Critical Discourse Analyses, I find that articles over
time actually appear to become more negative towards the IRA. Their overall tone, word choice,
and modality continue to reinforce the belief that the IRA is a violent organization, which only
desires a peace agreement as a tactical maneuver. Another findings is that some articles during
the negotiation also appear to become more negative towards the loyalist position, though they
never quite reach the same derision as the IRA. It appears from both the quantitative and
qualitative analyses that policymakers may not have to fear negotiations with terrorist groups.
When using Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA), the main component is to examine
underlying or assumed power relationships, hierarchies, and beliefs about ‘right’ and ‘truth’.
CDA scholars believe that speech, whether speech is defined as words, symbols, or actions, serve
a dual purpose – it both reinforces traditionally-held beliefs while also serving as an avenue to
challenge those ideologies (Fairclough 2003, 2008, Denton 2004, Edelman 1997, Billig 2008).
As Fairclough 2003 writes,
Ideologies are representations of aspects of the world which can be
shown to contribute to establishing, maintaining and changing social
relations of power, domination and exploitation. This ‘critical’ view of
ideology, seeing it as a modality of power, contrasts with various
‘descriptive’ views of ideology as positions, attitudes, beliefs,
perspectives, etc. of social groups. Ideological representations can be
identified in tests… but in saying that ideologies are representations
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which can be shown to contribute to social relations of power and
domination, I am suggesting that textual analysis needs to be framed in
this respect in social analysis which can consider bodies of texts in terms
of their effects on power relations (9).
Acknowledging that these ideologies and beliefs exist is often the first step towards
recognizing their role in preferencing certain social actors over others. Since all of my hypotheses
propose that the IRA will gain legitimacy over the course of the negotiations, and legitimacy is
measured as portrayal in newspaper articles, then a critical analyses of these articles becomes key
to determining if a deeper process is occurring. One of the potential faults in my quantitative
analysis may come in coding the portrayal quantitatively; there I used word frequency counts,
while other scholars, notably Johnson, Boyer and Brown (2011) and Niv-Solomon et al (2010)
utilize a more aggregate, categorical coding of entire paragraphs or phrases.
Since the quantitative chapter analyzed the articles via word frequency counts without
taking a larger, more aggregate view a la Niv-Solomon et al (2010), a CDA analysis will help us
determine whether a relationship exists that could not be determined previously. My use of CDA
includes several different aspects: (1) modality of titles and articles; (2) scrutiny of phrases, with
special focus on first paragraphs, to determine power and moral relationships and (3) overall tone
regarding the IRA and Sinn Fein.
Modal logic looks to different types of word choice relationships. Necessity v. possibility
(K logic), obligation v. forbidden (Deontic Logic), and Conditional Logic are all examples of
modality (“Modal Logic”). All of these logics qualify a statement, including providing evidence
of truth, possibility, and necessity. They also provide, as Sider (2003) writes, “ways of being true:
necessary truth and contingent truth” (1).
When a proposition if true, we may ask whether it could have been false.
If so, then it is contingently true. If not, then it is necessarily true; it must
be true’ it could not have been false. Falsity has modes as well: a false
proposition that could not have been true is impossible or necessarily
false; one that could have been true is merely contingently false (Sider,
2003, 1).
Modal terms are by default context-sensitive (Sider 2003, 1). What in one situation would seem
an appropriate response becomes inappropriate in another. Part of the difficulty in doing cross-
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national CDA involves this context-sensitivity. What is one culture at one time is appropriate (i.e.
the use of a swastika-type symbol to represent different religious rites) becomes inappropriate
(i.e. the use of the swastika to represent the Nazi party in general and the Holocaust in particular).
That is one reason for limiting this study to one negotiation in one country in a relatively short
time period – I hope to reduce issues of context-sensitivity by using roughly the same time and
geographic context.
For this qualitative section, the articles studied are a subset of the larger population. 5
articles per newspaper per cases totaling 50 articles were randomly chosen to provide a
randomized sample population. This smaller subset allows for a deeper analysis of each article,
rather than a generalizable, large-N analysis.
If we look at all the articles over the course of the negotiation, there does appear to be a
relationship between time elapsed during the negotiation and portrayal, though I acknowledge
that it is not a statistically significant relationship. The following two charts show the portrayal of
Fitted Values of IRA Negative Portrayals by Case

Negative IRA Portrayals

the IRA over time.
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IRA Positive Portrayals

Fitted Values of IRA Positive Portrayals by Case

As we can see from these charts, negative portrayal of the IRA increases during the negotiation,
while positive portrayals decrease. This is also evidenced by my CDA. If we look at the articles
as a whole, we see in the following chart that the Anti-IRA portrayal begins from the first day of
the first case and continues.

Telegraph
Times

Chart C: Negative IRA Articles by Case and by Newspaper
9/97
1/98
4/98
7/98
7/97 Negative Negative
Negative
Negative
Negative
60%
80%
80%
80%
80%
100%
100%
80%
80%
100%

Based solely off of this information, we can see that of the 5 articles within each subset,
The Belfast Telegraph articles become slightly more frequently anti-IRA, while The Times
(London) articles generally remain entirely anti-IRA. This potential relationship is counter to
what I proposed in my hypotheses – that both the Belfast Telegraph and The Times (London)
would become less negative as they granted the IRA legitimacy.
Yet these brief numbers alone cannot truly show us how the IRA is portrayed within the
articles. CDA further analyzes the subset to determine the extent of the portrayal, or the deepness
of the beliefs, about legitimacy, power, and hierarchy.
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As an example of the negative portrayal of the IRA increasing over time, we need only
look at Martina Purdy’s 7/19/97 “Hopes for Peace but no euphoria; How a course was set for SF”
as compared to Desmond McCartan’s 7/30/98 “Mo faces trouble on Assembly; Dissident MPs try
to block Sinn Fein role in Executive.”
In Purdy’s article, Sinn Fein is seen as having little to no individual agency, with their
course of action set for them by the IRA. Despite leading SF, the overall tone of the article was
neutral regarding the IRA. When examining modality, we must first remember that as a
newspaper, words such as ‘is’, ‘was’, and ‘will’ are the most common modal terms. This occurs
due to the format of newspaper articles. Due to this, I only examine those terms when they are
juxtaposed with modal terms such as ‘would’, ‘could’, ‘should’, ‘can’, and ‘may’, all of which are
used to show certainty, ‘truth’ or moral ‘rightness’ (Condoravdi 2003).
In “Hopes for Peace”, Purdy writes in the 1st paragraph that “Republicans were
increasingly optimistic their conditions would be met.” As a modal term, ‘would’ is metaphysical,
meaning it indicates what is either necessarily true or possibly true. ‘Would’, therefore, indicates
‘truth’. As Kripke (1959, 1963) writes, modality in particular, and CDA in general, are
discussions about possibilities, rather than actualities. As a non-positivist epistemology, CDA
examines how people construe the non-objective world as if it was actually ‘truth’. ‘Would’,
therefore, insists that a non-objective world is true, and must be true. In the sentence from
Purdy’s article, the reporter writes that Republicans (often used as a code word for the IRA)
believe not only that their conditions will be met, but ‘would’ (read: must) be met. The conditions
being met are here necessarily true, or at least the reporter believes that the IRA believes this.
Delving deeper into the sentence, we must also begin to question assumptions. CDA is
largely about discovering the hidden assumptions about power relationships, morality, and truth.
In the first part of the sentence – “Republican were increasingly optimistic” – we see the first
assumption that Republicans were, in fact, optimistic, and that optimism was growing. Purdy
does not attribute the idea of Republicans being optimistic to an individual Republican or
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representative of a Republican party. Rather, by simply writing ‘Republicans were’, Purdy offers
the dual assumption that Republicans were optimistic, even when they may not have been, and
that all Republicans were included in this optimism, again even when they may not have been.
This sentence is also a relational sentence, in that the Republican’s conditions being met are, by
their very nature, relational to the Unionists’ conditions. As two polar sides with the negotiation,
their conditions will be at opposing ends – should the Republicans’ be met, the Unionists’ are not,
or so the reporter appears to believe. Therefore, this sentence not only discusses that Unionist
conditions are being left out of the negotiation process, but that ‘truth’ shows that all Republicans
are being preferenced, and recognize this preference.
In her second paragraph, she writes, “The Labour [sic] administration, perhaps shaken by
the IRA response, issued an aide memoire to Sinn Fein in mid-June in the hope that the situation
could be rescued” (Purdy 7/19/97). This sentence is describing the IRA planting a car bomb in the
Belfast area of Poleglass after the new Prime Minister Blair gave a pro-Unionist speech and held
an unproductive meeting with Sinn Fein representatives. Within this sentence we see examples of
modality (‘perhaps’ and ‘could’), an example of power relationships and hierarchy (Labour
administration v. IRA), and assumptions (the Administration is weak and shaken by the response,
the use of an informal aide memoire being the only possible response, and Sinn Fein being
capable of controlling the IRA). In this sentence and the broader paragraph about the IRA using a
bomb as a response, we also find the assumption that the IRA views violence as the only
acceptable response. Rather than reporting on Sinn Fein’s political maneuvers, or any continued
meetings, the article only lists the bomb as the response. Within this sentence, Purdy
backgrounded the responsibility of the Blair administration for public relations missteps, and
foregrounded the IRA’s violent nature.
The difference between ‘perhaps’ and ‘could’ is small, but important. ‘Perhaps’ indicates
uncertainty. Here, Purdy is not sure about whether or not Blair was truly shaken by the IRA bomb
in Poleglass. If Blair was, indeed, shaken, then his response of sending an aide memoire to Sinn
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Fein appears to be a method of appeasement. If not, however, then his aide memoire cannot be
understood or accepted.
‘Could’, on the other hand, indicates not only possibility, but ability and likelihood.
‘Could’ contrasts with ‘should’, which indicates rightness and obligation. Though it does indicate
a possibility in that the counterfactual would be that the talks are not to be saved, ‘could’ is more
about likelihood. There is the chance that the talks will continue, but that chance is not high. In
this sentence, and in the broader paragraph, both Blair and the IRA are found guilty for the
potential collapse of the talks – Blair for his missteps, and the IRA for their immediate turn to
violence rather than discussing Blair’s pro-Unionist tone. In this paragraph, both Blair and the
IRA are responsible for the situation, and the tone appears only slightly anti-IRA.
Purdy changes her tone in the following sentence and paragraph by continuing to discuss
the IRA’s violence, specifically how the IRA “…cruelly withdrew…” from their 1994 ceasefire,
with all people “…bitterly aware the process is fragile, and fraught” (Purdy 7/19/97). This is
where the anti-IRA tone and assumptions about the IRA’s morality truly begin. Not only is the
IRA cruel for endings its 1994 ceasefire, but only the IRA is listed as being cruel. No Unionist
group or paramilitary squad is referenced as also being cruel or violent. In fact, the only negative
mention of Unionists occurs when Purdy writes about how the UK government withstood
pressure from Unionists to push pro-Unionist policies. This lack of discussion about the
negativity of Unionism and the focus on the IRA’s faults assumes that only the IRA is at fault.
Unionism is, at worst, a lobbyist, while the IRA cruelly sets bombs and causes people to be bitter
about a fragile, fraught future.
McCartan’s 7/30/98 article, “Mo faces trouble on Assembly; Dissident MPs try to block
Sinn Fein role in Executive” continues this anti-IRA trend. Here, however, there is not potential
for a neutral portrayal of the IRA, as we saw in Purdy’s piece. Rather, the IRA is foregrounded as
a terrorist organization continuing to use violence despite the ceasefire. The UK government is
rewarding the IRA’s terrorism by granting them seats in the new GFA-approved Assembly
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despite their violence. McCartan does briefly discuss Unionist violence, but refers to them as
paramilitary groups and does not mention any specific group by name.
Starting with modality, McCartan has some clear examples of ‘truth’ and ‘rightness’ in
this article. In the 7th paragraph, he writes, “it was unclear whether First Minister David Trimble,
who has been on holiday, and UUP deputy leader John Taylor would turn up to back the bill.”
Again we had the use of ‘would’ indicating both ‘truth’ – they are likely to – and ‘rightness’ –
they ought to. Trimble and Taylor, both Unionist representatives-turned-politicians are being
described here as needing to save the newly formed Assembly. Without them returning, the
chances of success are small; therefore, they ought to, need to, return.
The reason for the potential collapse of the new Assembly is that Unionists disagree with
allowing Sinn Fein’s seat at the Assembly when the IRA is continuing its violence. While the
Unionists’ concerns and anger are the immediate cause for the conflict, the deeper, truer cause is
IRA violence. If the IRA ended their violence, the Unionists would have no cause for concern.
This focus on the violent, terroristic nature of the IRA continues in the 8th paragraph, where
McCartan writes of a that Unionist are critical of the IRA being labeled a “…non-terrorist group”
(7/30/98). The assumption here is that only the IRA are terrorists, and that Unionists, and perhaps
the broader public, disagrees with the political reasons for labeling them non-terrorist. For
McCartan’s article, the ‘truth’ is that the IRA are terrorists; labeling them any differently is
wrong.
Modality continues to the 13th and 14th paragraph, where two quotes from Mo Mowlam,
the Secretary of State from Northern Ireland”, juxtaposes ‘must’ (a ‘rightness’ modal term) with
will (a ‘truth’ modal term). The quite reads: “’Paramilitary organizations have shown their ability
to stop those activities [punishment attacks and general violence] in the past. Now they must stop
them for good,’ she told MPs. ‘As I have said, the judgments I have made will be kept under
continuous review, and will become more and more stringent over time’” (McCartan, 7/30/98).
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Here, it is ‘right’ that paramilitary organizations end violence. Violence, and the use of
violence to achieve goals, is seen as illegitimate and wrong. Proper groups use peaceful political
methods to achieve their goals. That focus on ‘rightness’ is contrasted with the repetition of ‘will’
in reference to her judgments. Her judgments ‘will’ be reviewed and ‘will’ become more
stringent. There is no leeway, no possibility for change – this is going to happen, and groups must
prepare to be held to a tightened standard that will continually become higher over time. The
combination of a ‘truth’ and ‘rightness’ modal term in the same quote from a high-ranking
government official establishes the assumption that only non-violence and peace should be
rewarded, and that only those who eschew violence will take a seat at the governing table. This
assumption that non-violence is ‘right’ further assumes that any group who uses violence is
‘wrong’, and by only discussing IRA violence during the article, McCartan makes it clear that the
IRA is ‘wrong’.
The Belfast Telegraph does include the occasional neutral stance towards the IRA, such
as Martina Purdy’s 4/20/98 “Sinn Fein to push the system to limits; Party considers tactical
change”, though this often comes at the expense of Sinn Fein. The bulk of her article foregrounds
how Sinn Fein, like a rebellious child, is attempting to break down government-imposed barriers.
Rather than fighting violently or militarily, Sinn Fein is fighting politically, recognizing the
strategic importance of politics after the Good Friday Agreement. The IRA is only mentioned
once towards the end of the article.
Purdy’s use of modal terms increases in this article when compared to her previouslydiscussed article. In the 10th paragraph, for example, she quotes Gerry Adams’ claims about the
Good Friday Agreement, “..it clearly can be a transition. It clearly can be a basis for
advancement” (4/20/98). The repetition of ‘clearly’ establishes both truth and rightness. ‘Clearly’
allows for no other alternatives; the GFA is a transitional time and an advancement. Also,
‘clearly’ establishes an assumption of obviousness: the ‘truth’ of the GFA is obvious for all to
see. Not seeing that the GFA is the best course of action would be to blind oneself to the future.
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Purdy further writes in the 18th paragraph that “The change [to vote for the GFA] will no
doubt be sold on the basis that the Assembly is the ticket to the all-Ireland bodies” (4/10/98).
Though newspapers frequently use ‘will’ and ‘is’ in their articles to the point that a discussion of
these terms would include most sentences in the article, their juxtaposition with the 15th
paragraph’s sentence, “It seemed that Sinn Fein leaders might have got the assent of the Ard
Fheis.” ‘Will’ and ‘is’ are the epitome of surety and certainty, while ‘might’ is emblematic of
uncertainty. Here, Sinn Fein’s ability to pass the GFA through its membership is far less likely
than the way in which they will attempt to sell the Agreement. ‘Selling’ the Agreement gets far
less public approval than ‘marketing’ or ‘promoting’, establishing a negative view of Sinn Fein as
peddling the Agreement.
As I mentioned, though the Mowlam quote references paramilitary groups in general, the
article only discusses the IRA’s violence. Most articles from the cases follow this trend. Few
articles list violent Unionist groups by name, and when that happens, they are listed as
paramilitary organizations rather than terrorist groups. Names matter, and the character Dr. Who
said in the episode ‘The Shakespeare Code’, “…[T]here’s a power in words….The power of a
name. That’s old magic.”
As Bahtia (2005) writes, “The actual ability to name, and to have that name accepted by
the audience, holds great power. The authority of the name-giver – the individual seen to have
this linguistic power… will determine just how natural these names, words, and narratives are
viewed by an audience or reader” (9).
Names matter, especially when names can convey legitimacy, power, authority, and
morality. ‘Terrorist’ holds a special negative connotation (Bianchi 2006, Bhatia 2005, in that the
term elicits both confusion (who would chose to use those tactics?) and horror (why would
someone do that?). In naming a certain group a ‘terrorist’, rather than the more accepted
‘paramilitary’ or ‘dissident’ group, “an appeal to an audience is founded on a desire first to affirm
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an identity and to delineate an in-group from an outgroup and second to recruit supporters”
(Bahtia 2005, 12).
As Carruthers (2000) writes, the term ‘terrorist’ “…connotes illegitimacy, while its
alternatives – such as ‘guerilla’, ‘liberation army’, or ‘freedom fighter’ – confer approbation”
(165). ‘Paramilitary’ falls into the same approbation category, or, at least, a neutral category
depending upon the user. By continually naming the IRA ‘terrorist’ and reserving less-negative
terms for violent loyalist groups (if those groups are mentioned at all), the reporter reaffirms the
belief in the illegitimacy of the IRA and its tactics. Unionist groups and their tactics are rarely
referred to as ‘terrorist’. In fact, one of the few times the violent nature of the loyalist groups is
mentioned comes in Martin Fletcher’s 7/14/1998 article entitled, “A landscape strewn with
casualties and not a victor in sight”. Here, Fletcher discusses how violent loyalist groups are now
involved in murdering children, committing ethnic cleansing and hijacking the peace process.
Notice, however, that this article occurs in July of 1998, after the peace process ends and after a
year of the IRA ceasefire.
Bahtia (2005) continues, describing both the fluidity and rigidity of naming, and the role
of the media in supporting rhetoric:
…certain segments of the media… are decidedly reluctant to use the term
‘terrorist’, referring only to terrorist acts as attacks and instead labeling these
perpetrators as ‘militants’ or ‘rebels’. Moreover the media ‘line’ or ‘frame’ is not
always static, and is capable of shifting over the course of a crisis and
representing the parties in a different manner at different times, again depending
largely upon the representative activities of Western civil society institutions,
including media and on the intersection of their needs and demands with the
interests, beliefs and agendas of groups in Western society. (11)
Despite the fluid nature of naming in the media and the wariness of certain media segments to
refer to groups as ‘terrorist’, the Belfast Telegraph and The Times (London) apparently have little
concern over applying the term to the IRA. The Belfast Telegraph uses the term in 6 articles over
the course of the negotiation, while The Times (London) uses it in 46 articles. This, at least,
partially supports my suggestion that the Belfast Telegraph will view the IRA as more legitimate
at the starting point than The Times (London).
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When we focus on articles from The Times (London), we see that how even from the
beginning, reporters engaged in a negative tone. The Purdy article from the Belfast Telegraph
begins in a neutral tone and ends in a negative one. Nicholas Watt’s 7/31/98 article from The
Times (London), entitled. “Changing routes will make our future insecure” is anti-IRA and proloyalist from the start. In establishing that the IRA is the villain in the annual Orange Parade
marches in Drumcree, Watt uses modality and quotes to imply that the IRA and Sinn Fein were
attempting to destroy peaceful Unionist history and traditions. The only direct quotes from comes
from Fred Oliver, an Orangeman (Unionist) upset that nationalist groups in general, and the IRA
in particular, want the parades canceled. The quotes often utilize the modal term ‘will’, implying
necessity and lack of changeability.
Watt quotes in the title, “Changing route will make our future insecure”. The use of the
word ‘will’ implies necessity – changing the route has no choice but to make the future insecure.
It will impact the future in negative ways. Further, the use of ‘our’ is in reference to Oliver’s
quotes about how Unionists feel. Including it in the title with no further description as to whom
‘our’ refers suggests a general possession of the feeling; we are all insecure when the parades are
threatened. By making everyone insecure, the IRA becomes dangerous to all of society,
regardless of who is actually concerned about the parades.
In the 4th paragraph, Oliver is quoted as saying, “If nationalists don’t like the parade, they
should go inside and close their front doors” (Watt, 7/4/97). The use of ‘should’ as a modal word
indicates ‘rightness’. It is right and proper that nationalists close their doors to the parade. To do
anything else – protest, attack, etc. – would be considered ‘wrong’. Morality or ‘rightness’ modal
terms also serve to create an us/them mentality. If ‘we’ are right, then ‘they’ are wrong. In this
sentence, the Unionists are ‘right’ in marching to represent their history and traditions, and the
nationalists are ‘wrong’ to protest that the marches occur on nationalist streets. It does not matter
that nationalists often felt threatened by the marches, and in other articles even discussed a type
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of siege mentality during the marching season (Magee, 7/4/1998). All that matters is that the
Orangemen are ‘right’ in their ability to march and that the opposition must accept that.
Watt’s article further discusses the IRA’s violence in previous marching seasons, but
only in a quote from Oliver about how the IRA wanted to “…pick a fight” (7/4/1997). This
bullying mentality is used to justify the military response. In the first paragraph, Watt writes,
“Troops prepare for the worst in march stalemate” and continues in the 4th paragraph that “There
was no problem with our march until Sinn Fein-IRA stoked it up … to turn us against the
police… We have never abused anyone during our parade and the only abuse comes from the
Garvaghy Road [a section of Drumcree]” (7/4/1997). In these sentences, Watt indicates that the
only violent side to the marches comes from the IRA rather than a combination of the IRA and
loyalist groups, and that traditional police forces are ill equipped to handle the threat.
Occasionally, other reporters such as Magee (7/4/1998) contribute at least part of the
marching season violence to loyalist organizations. This narrative of the IRA as violent and
requiring a militarized response helps to both create and reinforce beliefs about the proper role
for, and response to, the IRA in broader Northern Irish society. As Denton (2004) concludes,
We make sense of events by the use of narratives. Narrative metaphors and images help
us understand the social and politics worlds in which we live. They also can sanction
some kinds of actions and not others. Narratives are explanations for events in the form
of short, commonsense accounts of stores. They contain images and judgments about the
motives and actions of our own groups and those of others. Groups with very different
beliefs and values construct very different narratives of an event. They are grounded in
selectively remembered and interpreted experiences. Within a community, a narrative
may emerge and gain easy consensus. Finally, narratives provide a sense of community
and connectedness (7).
In the majority of The Times (London) articles, the narrative is that the IRA is bad and
illegitimate, and uses violence which pushes the beleaguered unionists into responding. The
Belfast Telegraph also includes this narrative, but allows for a more nuanced view of the IRA and
loyalist groups. When The Times (London) maintains a neutral stance on the IRA, it still
references the IRA’s violent history.
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For example, Richard Miles’ 1/10/98 article entitled, “When banks brush with crooks
who have theft off to a fine art”, the IRA is backgrounded for most of the article, and only
referenced in discussing its killing of a gangster art thief. Though this may make the IRA seem
like a vigilante, a position in society, which often engenders praise for the vigilante’s ability to
punish the guilty when traditional government falls short, still emphasizes the killing nature of the
organization. Here, the IRA did not murder the unnamed art thief, but “…shot [him] dead” (Miles
1/10/98). Emphasizing the death of the thief emphasizes the violence of the organization. While
the article as a whole may be more neutral towards the IRA, this phrase still elicits the grimness
of violence.
Another The Times (London) article with a neutral stance on the IRA is Martin Fletcher’s
4/4/98 article entitled, “Bloody Sunday inquiry opens in Londonderry”. Fletcher’s appears to be
the main reporter covering the conflict in Northern Ireland, responsible for 38 of the 58 articles
for that newspaper. His articles include 16 references to the IRA as a ‘terrorist’ organization, and
24 negative portrayals.
The 4/4/98 article, however, is one of Fletcher’s few neutral portrayals of the IRA.
Fletcher writes about the 1972 killings of 26 civil rights protesters by the British Army during a
Northern Irish civil rights march. Fletcher quickly attributes blame for the killings to the British
government, though he wavers on whether or not the soldiers acted on orders or on their own. He
only mentions the IRA when referencing how they had already pulled back from the area,
suggesting that regardless of why the soldiers attacked, the people they attacked were innocent.
In the 4th paragraph, Fletcher writes, “The documents should finally reveal whether the
soldiers simply ran amok or were acting on the orders of their commanders or politicians
implementing a new ‘get tough’ policy. They should reveal why the notoriously tough 1 Para was
redeployed from Belfast to Londonderry” (4/4/98). The repetition of ‘should’ in both sentences
establishes ‘rightness’ – the people must know what happened and why. The government must
divulge its secrets, and to not do so is morally wrong.
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Despite this distrust of the UK government and the neutral stance towards the IRA,
Fletcher still indicates his preference for the government and his assumption that the government
is more legitimate than the IRA. This is evidenced in his use of the name ‘Londonderry’ rather
than ‘Derry’. ‘Londonderry’ is the name preferred by Unionists due to its link with the British
settlement of Northern Ireland in the 1600s (Byrnes, 2010). ‘Derry’ is the original name for the
town, and is still used by nationalist groups and musicians16 to refer to the organization. Using
‘Londonderry’ rather than ‘Derry’ presupposes that ‘Londonderry’ is the proper term for the
town, even though the name is disputed. As mentioned previously, names matter as they establish
an identity and create a narrative. Here, Fletcher identifies the town in a Unionist bent and creates
a pro-UK government narrative beneath the negative-UK soldier/government narrative.
While the quantitative analysis of the broader article list rarely showed probabilistic
relationships between the newspapers, time elapsed, and portrayal, the qualitative analysis
suggests an underlying relationship of disapproval for, and illegitimacy of, the IRA. The IRA is
rarely seen as neutral or positive. 136 of the 186 articles include negative references, or 73%. 75
of The Times (London) articles and 53 Belfast Telegraph articles include a negative reference.
From this starting point, we can see that The Times (London) is more likely to maintain a
negative view of the IRA, and that negative views of the IRA increase over time. If we examine
our articles on the whole by newspaper, we see that in The Times (London), negative portrayals
increase:

16

Phil Coulter’s song ‘The Town I Loved So Well’ is about life in Derry/Londonderry, and
references not only the violence in the town, but specifically calls it Derry to show his preference
for the nationalist position despite his distaste for the violence.
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IRA Negative Portrayals by
Case

IRA Negative Portrayals by
Case for Times (London)

IRA Negative Portrayals

In the Belfast Telegraph, the portrayal remains relatively consistent:

IRA Negative Portrayals
by Case for Belfast
Telegraph

Though this is not a probabilistic relationship, there does appear to be the start of a
relationship which can support at least part of our hypotheses: the Belfast Telegraph is more
likely to view the IRA as legitimate, or, at least, less likely for them to be viewed as illegitimate
when compared to The Times(London). The articles I discussed here17 show how the reporters
viewed the IRA and its violence as illegitimate through the use of modal terms expressing the
‘truth’, surety, and ‘rightness’ of peaceful methods, the British government, and loyalist groups.
17

Only a small amount of articles were discussed at length in this chapter due to length
constraints. A full analysis of all 50 articles is available upon request.
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Despite the Belfast Telegraph seeming to retain a slightly more positive view of the IRA,
that positive portrayal does not increase over the time of the negotiations. In fact, in both
newspapers, the negative portrayals increase thereby adding yet another refutation to our
hypotheses that the IRA would gain legitimacy (and positive portrayals) during a negotiation. In
both the quantitative and qualitative analyses, the hypotheses do not appear to be true.
Provided this is the case, that negotiations do not increase a terrorist group’s legitimacy,
then policymaker’s fears of such negotiations may be tenuous. If, as many policymakers say,
negotiations will serve to legitimize terrorist groups and their methods, then negotiations would
lead to future terrorist attacks, thereby threatening the security of the state. In this study, however,
I find that terrorist groups, or at least their violent aspects, do not appear to gain legitimacy. In
fact, their violent histories continue to be vilified in the press, with some articles seeming to serve
merely to remind readers of the violent history of the IRA.
Of course, this study is limited to one terrorist organization and one negotiation. It is
possible that different types of terrorist organizations may find different amounts of legitimacy
during negotiations, or that different types of negotiations (i.e. hostage negotiations v. GFA-style
negotiations) may evoke different views on legitimacy. Future studies may wish to examine
whether negotiations similar to the GFA, such as the Oslo Accords or the on-again-off-again
negotiations between FARC and Colombia, result in similar findings.
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Chapter 5: Conclusion
In 1993, Palestinian and Israeli leaders met in secret in Norway without intermediaries
and negotiated an agreement. This agreement, the Oslo Accord, ended with Israel
agreeing to recognize Palestinian authority in Gaza and the West Bank, and with the
Palestinians recognizing Israel’s right to exist. In recognition of their roles in the
negotiations, Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin and Palestinian Liberation
Organization (PLO) leader Yasser Arafat both received the Nobel Peace Prize. The
extraordinary part of this story is that, even during the negotiations, Israel recognized the
PLO as a terrorist organization (‘Palestine Liberation Organization’) and continued to
maintain its ‘no negotiation’ policy stance towards terrorist groups. The PLO, acting as
am umbrella organization for several subgroups, represented Fatah, which is still
considered a terrorist organization by the U.S. government (‘Foreign Terrorist
Organization’).
This disparity between a public ‘no negotiation’ policy and a private negotiation
is not uncommon for governments. Policymakers fear that negotiating with terrorist
groups will do one of two things: (1) legitimize the terrorist organization individually and
terrorism as a tactic; and (2) open the government up to future attacks. As Cronin (2010)
writes, “There is nothing less popular than so-called appeasement in the face of terrorist
attacks on innocent victims: entering talks with the perpetrators can be political suicide,
especially in a democracy” (2). This focus on the role of negotiations presupposes that
terrorist groups seek legitimacy and learn from one another. Even negotiating with
individual terrorists, rather than an organization as a whole a la the Oslo Accords and the
Good Friday Agreement, falls prey to similar concerns, “Negotiation with terrorist
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hostage-takers raises several types of problems: recognizing terrorists as acceptable
counterparts; setting up precedents, encouraging terrorists to persist in their methods,
becoming trapped in a relationship that may elicit ore concessions than necessary” (Faure
and Zartman, 2010, 10). In this paper, I limit my study of terrorism to international
terrorists, groups who injure, or threaten to injure, foreigners or foreign businesses, or
operate on foreign soil.
So if negotiations do indeed lead to a legitimization of terrorism and the terrorist
group, and to further attacks, negotiations would seem to be a poor choice for
policymakers. This then begs the question of why those negotiations still occur, albeit
often in secret? If negotiation leads to a continued cycle of violence and rewards the
terrorist group with greater authority, power, and access, then governments should not
use negotiations as a policy tool.
What we have seen, however, is that some negotiations do indeed lead to an end
of violence. As Frampton (2012) writes, “…the International Monitoring Commission in
October 2006 and March 2007, confirming that the organization [IRA] was now ‘fully
committed’ to the political path, had disbanded its operational structures; and had ceased
engaging in violent acts” (231). Cronin (2010) agrees that negotiations can bring an end
to violence in certain circumstances. In her study of the role of negotiations in ending
terrorist organizations, she finds that 18% of terrorist groups entered into negotiations,
and only 1 in 10 actually failed (4), with some of the remaining groups putting down their
weapons after a negotiation. Jones and Lipicki (2008) find that 43% of the groups in
their study joined the political process and adopted non-violence, due, in large part, to
prior negotiations with their government (18-19).
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Jones and Lipicki (2008) continue by differentiating terrorist groups by
motivation, and find that, “[t]errorists fighting for broad goals, such as social revolution
or empire, are less likely to reach a negotiated settlement than are groups fighting for
limited aims, such as policy change or territorial change. When a terrorist group’s goals
are minimal, there may be a middle ground from which to draw a compromise
settlement” (21). This differentiation by goals opens the door for a distinction on policy
options – in certain circumstances and with certain terrorist groups, negotiation may be a
viable option. Perhaps this is why governments continue their negotiations while also
professing a strict ‘no negotiations’ policy.
While scholars such as Cronin (2010), Jones and Lipicki (2008), and Zartman
(2003) state that negotiations can lead to a successful end to the terrorist organization, ‘no
negotiation’ stances are still utilized. Policymakers are concerned with increasing
terrorism’s legitimacy as a viable political tool, and in seeming weak and appeasing to
their electorate. As Hetherington (2005) states, political trust, or the degree to which
people think the government is achieving their objectives, forces citizens and
policymakers to focus more on output and performance (9). If, in a democracy especially,
citizens do not believe the government is achieving the objective of keeping them safe
from future attacks, or if the negotiations do indeed lead to further attacks, then the
citizens will lose their political trust in the governing bodies (Browne and Dixon, 2010,
381).
Tucker (1998) and Jones and Lipicki (2008) showed that negotiations do not
necessarily lead to future attacks, which eases the second fear of negotiation. The first,
though, still remains. Do negotiations serve to legitimize the terrorist group? That is the
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main question I aimed to answer in this study, though there is still much research to be
conducted on the topic.
‘Legitimacy’ is, perhaps, one of the most difficult terms to conceptualize in
political science. It is an inherently normative concept that presupposes that certain
organizations are legitimate while others are not (Cook 2003, 109). Legitimacy can mean
public support or approval, trust in government, or even simply the lack of public protest;
no study has yet been created with a definitive answer on conceptualizing legitimacy
(Cook 2003, 110). In the state-centric world of Westphalian politics, legitimacy resides in
the state system. Even the commonly used definition of statehood from Weber indicates
the importance of legitimacy; for him, a state is any community that has monopolized the
legitimate use of physical force (Weber, as quoted in Warner 1991). If the state is the
only truly legitimate organization, then we live in a zero-sum world, where any gain in in
legitimacy by a non-state group must therefore be a legitimacy reduction for the state.
This fear of giving up legitimacy to a non-state organization, and especially an inherently
violent organization such as a terrorist organization, means that policymakers must
outlaw any behavior that can be seen to grant legitimacy towards those groups.
When negotiating, one generally does not sit down at the table unless one views
the opposing side as in some way legitimate. Negotiating with an illegitimate actor would
mean that one cannot hope to guarantee that the agreed-upon outcome will be followed.
In a hostage situation, for example, police do not negotiate with a random person. There
is an intentionality in who they chose to speak with – the person responsible for the
action who can put the outcome into effect (i.e. the ‘legitimate’ actor). Legitimacy may
also be derived not by the possibility of a successfully enacted agreement, but because
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the person or group is seen as the rightful representative of a larger population. Rabin and
Mowlam may not have personally believed that Arafat and Adams could deliver a fullyexecuted agreement in their respective negotiations, but did believe that Arafat and
Adams were the representatives of their populations, in whom the populations placed
their trust.
Despite the difficult inherent in conceptualizing ‘legitimacy’, the topic itself
“…often plays a central role in conflicts between state and terrorist organizations; in
these conflicts, each side contests the other’s legitimacy” (Cook 2003, 108). Terrorist
groups are one of the least legitimate organizations within society, intentionally
eschewing using the political system to achieve goals, even if those organizations
maintain political parties to run in elections (Criado, 2011, 497). Terrorist groups can
receive their legitimacy from the population in which they live, provided they provide
social services or are articulating long-held grievances (Criado 2011, Daxecker and Hess
2013), or, as policymakers fear, from a grant from the state government via a seat at the
negotiating table.
In the zero-sum world of Westphalian politics, this granting of legitimacy means a
reduction in state legitimacy. By removing legitimacy from the state and giving it to the
terrorist group, a negotiation serves to make the terrorist group and its tactics acceptable
in the eyes of the public. Thirkell-White differentiates between ‘political legitimacy’ –
the ability to make rules as the governing body – and ‘moral legitimacy’ – appearing
‘right’ to society (2006, 336). Other scholars, such as Fabre (2008) and Gilley (2009) add
that the organization must be obeyed in order to be legitimate; an organization can claim
legitimacy, but if it is not obeyed, then it does not truly hold legitimacy.
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In this study, I begin with Norris’ (1999) multidimensional definition of
legitimacy, which analyzes trust and support. Diffuse support examines support for the
organization’s ideas as a whole, while specific support looks to whether individuals in
power are accepted. Once defined, I now conceptualize diffuse and specific support in
two ways. First, in the quantitative chapter, I used a tobit analysis of word frequency
counts to determine whether the IRA received negative or positive media portrayal. I
believe that this looks to specific support – how the IRA was portrayed during the
negotiation as a result of its leaders’ policy choices.
The qualitative chapter uses Critical Discourse Analysis to examine diffuse
support – whether the underlying ideas and beliefs about the IRA are accepted and
viewed positively. In this chapter, Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) allows us to
understand norms of power relationships, morality, and ‘truth’. CDA is inherently nonpositivist; it assumes that there is no objective world, and that the only reality is the one
which we, as a collective, create for ourselves. This focus on a collective belief system
leads into the idea that different groups may have different beliefs. Since terrorism is
largely a media event, designed to gain as much publicity as possible for the organization
and to use the media to frighten the target audience into acceptance, how populations
view the organization becomes important in understanding views of legitimacy.
I argue that the domestic population will view the terrorist organization as more
legitimate from the beginning, and that view of legitimacy will increase during the
negotiation process. I believe that this is due to the domestic population, or the population
in the same geographic area as the terrorist organization, either (1) experience the nonviolent, social welfare aspects of the organization or (2) feel that the organization is the
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only one articulating their needs. The second population is the international population,
the true focus of international terrorism. Here, the international terrorist wishes to
frighten the international (target) population. I hypothesize that the target population will
view the terrorist organization as less legitimate, since they only experience the negative
aspects of the group, rather than the social welfare or interest articulation.
As such, I include 4 hypotheses.

Domestic Population (Domestic)
1a. After negotiations, the domestic population will view the terrorist group and its violence as more
legitimate, as measured by positive portrayal
1b. Before negotiation, the domestic population will view the terrorist group and its violence as more
legitimate, as measured by positive portrayal.
Target Government/Populations (International)
2a. After negotiations, the international population will view the terrorist group and its violence as
more legitimate, as measured by positive portrayal
2b. Before negotiations, the international population will view the terrorist group and its violence as
less legitimate, as measured by negative portrayal

In the quantitative chapter, Tobit analysis is used due to the truncated nature of
the regressions. Since our cases are groups of newspaper articles, and newspaper articles
are limited by a word count due to their need to be printed. Most of the word counts were
under 10 uses per article. This truncation meant that a traditional OLS or logit analysis
could create skewed results.
The quantitative analysis provided little support for my hypotheses. Though
descriptive statistics suggests that the time elapsed over the course of the negotiations
could lead to fewer negative portrayals, and that the Belfast Telegraph was less likely to
use negative portrayals (64% versus 72% for The Times (London)), tobit regressions
showed that neither case nor audience was statistically significant in reducing negative
portrayals. The relationship between ‘Case’ and ‘IRA Positive Portrayal’ shows that the
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Belfast Telegraph is less likely to portray the IRA positively. This is directly counter to
Hypothesis 1A, which posited that the domestic population would view the terrorist
group more positively and with more legitimacy due to the social welfare and interest
articulation benefits provided by the organization. As Bosi (2012) writes, joining the IRA
was often a result of a specific, traumatic event with the IRA representing the
community’s struggle (350-351).
While on the one hand articulating nationalist interests about ghettoization, and
discrimination in education and employment, the IRA also provided a sense of
community and protection from loyalist and U.K. forces. As Criado (2011) writes, it is
this local community which first grants the terrorist organization legitimacy by providing
“…new recruits and logistical support, such as places to hide, economic resources,
intelligence on the state’s actions, and collaboration…” (497-498). Despite this, however,
my results show that the IRA did not gain positive portrayals via the negotiations, and, in
fact, lost that portrayal. It would appear, then, that negotiations do not add legitimacy to a
terrorist group, but, in fact, may reduce the legitimacy of the terrorist tactics. It would
appear, therefore, that negotiations brought about a delegitimization of the group and its
violent tactics.
When we further examine the legitimacy of Sinn Fein, ‘Case’ is not statistically
significant in any of its models. It would seem, then, that negotiations may not impact the
legitimacy of the peaceful political party associated with the terrorist group, which is
counter to what I previously suggested. Earlier, I anticipated that as a negotiation
continued, the citizens could add legitimacy to the political party as they viewed the
associated terrorist group as leaving behind the violent tactics of the past.
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‘Newspaper’ is statistically significant in Model 5, the positive portrayal of Sinn
Fein. It appears then, that the Belfast Telegraph is more likely to portray Sinn Fein
positively than The Times (London). This is as expected, and fits with Hypotheses 1b. and
2b., which suggested that audience would matter in determining legitimacy via portrayal.
‘Newspaper’ was not statistically significant when examining the IRA’s portrayal,
though, so that support for Hypotheses 1b and 2b is limited. Gaining significance only
when Sinn Fein is portrayed and not the IRA suggests that the Belfast Telegraph may
differentiate the IRA and Sinn Fein more than The Times (London). Living amongst Sinn
Fein and the IRA may have allowed reporters at the Belfast Telegraph to see the
differences in policy and tactics between the IRA and Sinn Fein in a way that reporters in
the UK may not.
The combination of gaining positive portrayal for Sinn Fein but losing it over
time for the IRA suggests that policymakers fears about legitimizing terrorist groups via a
negotiation may be unfounded. The specific support I analyzed in the introduction,
measured via the newspaper portrayal where specific policy options for Sinn Fein and the
IRA are discussed, does not appear to increase over the course of a negotiation. Had the
IRA’s positive portrayal increased over the course of the negotiation, or had ‘Case’ been
significant in Sinn Fein’s positive portrayal, would have suggested that policy concerns
were valid. However, with ‘Case’ negative for Model 2 (IRA Positive Portrayal) and not
statistically significant for the IRA, specific support for the terrorist group wanes over the
course of a negotiation.
This findings can be helpful for policymakers looking to legitimize peace rather
than violence. In this situation, the violence of the IRA was delegitimized, while the
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peaceful attributes of Sinn Fein – the IRA’s mouthpiece and associated political party –
were legitimized. Policymakers, whether knowingly or unknowingly, backgrounded the
violence while foregrounding the peaceful politics, effectively removing the terrorist
group and its tactics from the community. Because access was contingent upon a
ceasefire, the group could not engage in its violence and still gain power via the political
process.
When we examine diffuse support via the qualitative analysis, we see a similar
situation where the IRA does not gain positive portrayal or legitimacy over the course of
the negotiations. Using Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA), we can see that hidden – and
sometimes explicit – assumptions about power and validity. Legitimacy, or who is
deemed an acceptable actor, matters, especially in conflict-ridden societies. “It matters
for conflict parties, given that their active participation in peace negotiations potentially
generates domestic political support and international legitimacy and secures their
influence in post-conflict state institutions” (Lanz 2011, 276). As Lanz (2011) continues,
in the realpolitik world of Westphalian states, only those actors who are deemed as
acceptable and capable of sustaining an agreement are allowed access to negotiations
(281). This means that the prima facie requirement for even entering a negotiation is
some base level of legitimacy.
CDA helps elucidate assumptions about ‘truth’, morality, and legitimacy by
providing an avenue for analyzing how speech acts confer or reinforce social beliefs.
Speech acts do not only involve actual speech, but any action which communicates ideas,
such as art, music, graffiti, product placement, and the written word (Stillar 1998). When
people are part of a specific speech community, meaning they hold to the predominant
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beliefs within a group, they “…alter their norms for speech behavior to conform to the
appropriate speech community, by adding, subtracting, and substituting rules of
communicative behavior” (Fasold 1991, 42).
CDA stresses the role of communication in portraying accepted messages, written
in a language code, which the readers, viewers, or listeners are able to decipher as part of
that language community (Yaguello 1998, 6). When employing CDA as a methodology, I
look for certain facets of communication that convey those accepted messages. These
include modality, or terms which express ‘truth’ and ‘rightness’; hidden assumptions
evidenced by words such as ‘clearly’, or phrases which make a statement that one must
simply accept as true; and word placement within titles and first paragraphs.
When I examined the subset of our articles, I discovered that the qualitative
outcomes reflected the quantitative outcomes. In the quantitative section, neither the IRA
nor Sinn Fein gained positive portrayal (i.e. legitimacy) via the negotiations. This is
mirrored in the qualitative research, which finds that over the course of the negotiations,
IRA negative portrayals did not appear to decrease.
Initial findings showed that Cases 3 (January 1998) and 5 (July 1998) contained
fewer negative portrayals of the IRA than their preceding cases, but a qualitative analysis
showed that negative impressions of the IRA continued despite the negotiations. Their
overall tone, modality and specific word choice continue to reinforce the notion that the
IRA is an evil organization with few qualms about hurting civilians. In the articles
directly discussed in the CDA chapter18, I show how portrayals of the IRA may have

18

Due to page constraints, only a small number of the subset of 50 CDA-analyzed articles is
discussed in the qualitative chapter. A CDA examination of all 50 articles is available upon
request. Article titles, bylines, and dates for all 186 articles are included in the appendix for
reference.
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even become more negative during the course of the negotiations. These articles are used
as exemplars of the larger societal forces hidden below the surface – while paying lip
service to the idea that the IRA had instituted a ceasefire and was working to maintain
that ceasefire, the memory of past violent actions was never far behind. Whole articles
appeared to have a single purpose- to remind readers of the IRA’s history of murder,
kidnap, and bombing. For example, an article not previously discussed, “Trauma lingers
for terror ideal Alice” in the Belfast Telegraph on 4/13/98 seems to serve a sole
requirement – to remind readers that the violence, hurt, and memories of IRA tactics
continue to the present day for their victims. Other articles also continue to reference how
victims of IRA attacks still suffer the consequences. This reminiscing serves an
intentional purpose; despite potentially requiring a type of ‘communal forgetting’ for
peace to become a reality between the opposing parties, reporters seem reluctant to allow
IRA past actions be disremembered.
In the articles analyzed in the qualitative chapter, we see the continuation of
norms of anti-violence, backgrounding the IRA, and occasionally foregounding the
violent Loyalist paramilitaries. What we do not often see is the equal disdain for all
paramilitary groups; where the IRA is mentioned by name, and republican
paramilitary/terrorist groups are differentiated in IRA and named dissident groups,
loyalist organizations are usually called only ‘paramilitary’ groups, and are lumped
together into a single heading. As I discussed, naming conventions matter, as names
confer respectability, legitimacy, and morality. Choosing to call a group a ‘terrorist’
rather than a ‘paramilitary’ group confers a state of illegitimacy and disrespectability
upon the organization, as the term ‘terrorist’ maintains a negative connotation of
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illegitimacy and distrust. Terrorist groups are the epitome of anti-state organizations, and
in the case of the IRA, are formed to overthrow the state government and take control
over a certain territory. While Jones and Lipicki (2008) may consider this to be a more
limited goal, the overthrow of an established government and the institution of a new
government by an armed minority group over the wishes of the majority group is
generally not considered ‘right’.
Once we move beyond the role of naming in establishing beliefs about legitimacy
and ‘truth’, we see the continuation of a pro-loyalist/anti-IRA view in the fact that the
IRA is called out by name for its violent actions, whereas loyalist groups are generally
referred to under a single heading. By merging them all together, loyalist groups are
given the ability to obfuscate their individual responsibility for their actions. By not
mentioning groups by name or discussing their violent methods in the same depth and
characteristics as that reserved for the IRA, responsibility and agency for loyalist attacks
against nationalists is hidden. In this situation, the IRA is the responsible for the violence,
and if loyalists groups are involved, it is in defense of their population. It is the rare
article indeed which calls out specific loyalist groups or truly discusses their violent
tactics. Magee’s 7/4/98 “Along the road to despair” describes a type of siege mentality
that exists due to loyalists’ insistence on holding marches in nationalist neighborhoods,
and Thornton’s 1/2/98 “LVF murder claim ‘true’” discusses unionist terrorism as a
reprisal for the killing of an imprisoned LVF leader. Yet both of these articles also
maintain anti-IRA rhetoric and include mentions of past IRA violence. Thornton, for
example, only mentions the IRA at the end of the article, but makes sure that this
reference is negative. In his article, he fears that the IRA is working behind the scenes
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(while publically maintaining its ceasefire) to undermine the peace process. Magee’s
article, though largely about the nationalist victims of the summer marching season, is
sure to link her mentions of the IRA with the words ‘murder’ and ‘killing’, both clearly
negative terms.
Guelke (1986) makes an important distinction between the IRA and loyalist
paramilitary groups such as the UDA. He writes that while the government proscribes the
IRA, the UDA is legal, despite calls for its illegality from Catholics and nationalists (92).
He states that due to their sanctioning by the government, the UDA has not had to accept
direct responsibility for its actions (Ibid. 92).
We see, therefore, that even when reporters attempt to distribute blame relatively
equally, the IRA always emerges as the villain rather than the hero. In none of the 50
randomly chosen articles was the overall tone pro-IRA. Articles that maintain a more
neutral tone of the IRA, such as Purdy’s 7/19/97 “How a course was set for SF”, still
insist that the IRA are involved in violence. Purdy’s article, while largely blaming the
Blair administration for the failure of the 1994 ceasefire, still refers to the violence of the
IRA, though she calls it ‘paramilitary’ rather than terrorist.
If articles on the aggregate are not granting legitimacy to the IRA over the course
of the negotiations, and a deeper analysis of hidden assumptions show that views about
the IRA’s role in society continue to emphasize the history of violence and distrust, then I
suggest that negotiations do not increase a terrorist group’s legitimacy. Rather, I posit
that holding negotiations contingent upon ceasefires and continuing to write negatively
about the IRA and its tactics while rhetorically supporting Sinn Fein legitimizes Sinn
Fein and its peaceful political maneuvers while delegitimizing the IRA and its violence.
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Here, the violent IRA is backgrounded while Sinn Fein is foregrounded and therefore
legitimized. By legitimizing Sinn Fein at the expense of the IRA, policymakers made
Sinn Fein and politics respectable while minimizing the ‘rightness’ of anti-state violence.
This dichotomy – an illegitimate violent IRA
Scholars have already examined how and why negotiations can help end terrorist
violence (Jones and Lipicki 2008, Cronin 2010), but I try to answer the other stated
reason for not holding negotiations with terrorist groups.
If negotiations do not increase a terrorist group’s legitimacy and alter the framing
of an ‘us’ versus ‘them’ mentality, why then do scholars such as McEvoy, McEvoy and
McConnachie (2006) write that a hegemonic shift has occurred in relationships between,
and beliefs about, the IRA? Is it possible that the violence of the IRA is forgotten so that
the community can move forward with reconciliation? Or perhaps views about whether
the IRA’s terrorism can be morally justified has changed, though Shanahan (2009) writes
that terrorism has nearly always been, and probably will always remain, morally
unjustifiable by most people?
There are several possible reasons for a successful conclusion to the Good Friday
Accords and the move towards reconciliation and better relationships between
nationalists and unionists in Northern Ireland. First, as McEvoy, McEvoy and
McConnachie (2006) suggest, it is possible that the reevaluation of Northern Irish society
during the GFA process and the highly-valued pursuit of peace drew the majority of the
IRA membership into the political process, forcing hardliners to leave the party and form
their own dissident groups. It is also possible that Adams and the IRA leadership
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genuinely reexamined the IRA’s tactics and discovered that Northern Irish society
(nationalists included) genuinely did not approve of terrorist tactics.
I cannot examine these two situations in this study, though future studies may
wish to include an analysis of approval ratings or trust figures for the IRA during the
1997-1998 time period. There are other situations that could, in future iterations, be
included in this study.
The first situation is methodological. Conceptualizing ‘legitimacy’ is fuzzy at
best, and using newspaper portrayal through word frequency counts is a second-best
option. Niv-Solomon et al (2011) also examine written words to understand hidden
assumptions. Rather than using word counts only, they add in a context-specific
assessment of entire phrases or paragraphs to determine how words are embedded within
a larger text.
A modified conceptualization of legitimacy to include approval ratings coupled
with a methodology that quantified how words are embedded within a larger text could
provide a different outcome. Yet this may not be the only reason for a lack of statistically
significant variables or minimal support for the hypotheses. Though I analyze five
distinct time periods to understand how perceptions about the IRA change over time, it is
possible that 12 months is not long enough to truly alter views about legitimacy.
Future studies may wish to consider that an extended period of time could
introduce greater understanding about changes in perception. For example, it may be that
true changes in views about legitimacy require an entire generation to pass, allowing the
new generation, who had little direct contact with the terrorist organization’s violent past,
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to create new social norms. While this may be true, I do not believe that it should impact
the hypotheses and policymakers’ actions.
Policymakers are concerned about negotiating with terrorists for fear that such
negotiations would open the government up to further attacks once the group and its
actions are legitimized. If terrorists learn by watching the success of other terrorists and
imitate those supposedly successful actions, as Midlarsky, et al (1980) write, then
policymakers must be concerned about the immediate impact of a legitimacy gain. While
terrorist organizations such as the IRA often have larger, metaphysical concerns (i.e.
nationalism), each action is generally preceded by an immediate cause. For example, the
IRA’s bomb attack may have metaphysically been an attempt to force the UK out of
Northern Ireland, but its immediate precedent was the feeling that the UK had ‘betrayed’
Sinn Fein and the IRA during the 1994 ceasefire (Fletcher, 7/21/97).
In the case of learning-by-imitation in terrorist actions, I propose that groups who
feel that terrorism is being rewarded due to inclusion within a negotiation will act
relatively quickly to capitalize upon that reward. I believe it is unlikely that they will wait
an entire generation to ensure that a total change in legitimacy occurs. Rather, they are
more likely to see that a specific action (i.e. negotiation) worked, and then attempt to
utilize that action to achieve their own success.
When writing of this imitation, or ‘contagion’ as they called it, Midlarsky, et al
(1980) contagion occurs in a hierarchical pattern, with established groups engaging in an
action (negotiation), and then smaller groups imitating that behavior (272). If this is
indeed the case with learning among terrorist groups, then extending the time period
studied to include an entire generation may not be necessary. Some extension could be
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helpful to provide enough time for learning and imitation to occur. Hence, I suggest that
future studies extend the time period to cover five years, seemingly enough time for
imitation but not so long as to include a different immediate precedent.
Another area with room for further exploration would be to compare the portrayal
and legitimacy of the IRA over the course of the negotiations with a different terrorist
organization during a different negotiation. The UN’s peacekeeping missions are most
successful when both sides recognize that a peaceful resolution is needed; perhaps the
success of the Good Friday process and the reason for including the IRA in negotiations
was not due to a gain or loss in legitimacy, but due to both sides simply recognizing that
not other option existed. This could appear on the surface to be about legitimacy, but in
reality would have been only the last resort of a troubled constituency. If this is the case,
then a comparative survey of other terrorists groups during negotiations could further
illuminate if negotiations do indeed serve to legitimize groups, or if they only occur when
terrorism itself becomes outdated and unacceptable. If it is the latter, then policymakers
need not fear negotiations with terrorist groups, as the mere act of negotiation precludes
the legitimacy of the terrorist action as viable and acceptable.
Until these modifications are conducted, however, I conclude that policymakers’
concerns regarding granting legitimacy to a terrorist group via negotiations may be
unfounded. The statement seems to be more of a knee-jerk reaction or political maneuver,
designed to make the politician appear strong and capable in the eyes of their
constituency rather than based on evidence. My study showed that despite the
negotiations, or, perhaps, because of it, the IRA did not gain positive portrayals and, in
fact, grew only in negative portrayals.
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As Smithey (2011) shows, an identity change occurred in Northern Ireland
starting in the mid-1990s. He calls is a “…clear and intentional change… undertaken to
alter familiar symbols and practices including flags, parades, and bonfires as part of a
cultural transformation in the region” (3). It is not that the IRA has gained legitimacy as a
result of the negotiations, but rather the ‘us’ versus ‘them’ mentality has lost legitimacy
as the society attempts reconciliation. Smithey (2011) continues by saying that in
Northern Ireland, communities chose to alter symbolic actions that would have
previously led to a strengthening of ‘us’ versus ‘them’ and conflict (i.e. parades and
bonfires) and instead worked on the “..softening of a politically charged symbolic
landscape and a reconsideration of polarized ethnopolitical ideals” (6). Here, neither the
IRA nor terrorism gained in legitimacy; terrorism itself lost legitimacy as the Northern
Irish moved away from accepting violence and towards searching for peace and
reconciliation.
When surveyed after the Good Friday Agreement was put into effect, scholars
found that Unionist communities were more likely to retain their Unionist cultural views
and traditions (Todd et al 2009) while nationalists were more likely to leave behind their
previous identities and move towards a ‘Northern Irish’ identity (Muldoon et al 2007).
The idea that identity can change, and often does as a result of social changes (Waddel
and Kairns 1986, Cassidy and Trew 2004, Turner et al 1987), suggests that in Northern
Ireland, the Good Friday Agreement reduced the legitimacy of the IRA while supporting
the legitimacy of the new political institutions and community rebuilding. This is directly
counter to Hypotheses 1a and 2a, which posit that negotiations would bring legitimacy to
a terrorist organization. If negotiations do not, in fact, bring legitimacy to terrorist
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organizations, then policymakers need not fear including those groups in talks. Current
‘no negotiation’ policies can change to include negotiations with certain groups19, and
may be able to bring resolution to terrorist conflicts.

19

I do not analyze absolute terrorist organizations in this study as their goals (total destruction of
the existing order) do not appear to be conducive to settlement via negotiations.
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Bilateral talks may be the way forward for
Trimble

Belfast
Telegraph
Belfast
Telegraph
Belfast
Telegraph
Belfast
Telegraph
Belfast
Telegraph
Belfast
Telegraph
Belfast

Desmond McCartan and
Mark Simpson
Paul Connelly and
Michael Devine

Villagers hold memorial for bomb victims
Mo set for Dublin meeting on talks; New
move to plan next step in process
Relaxed pace for police patrols; Ceasefire
eases security operations
Paragon of peace or party pooper?;
Decision time for John Hume - and the
SDLP
Agreement on the streets
Politicians unite in shock and sorrow;
Tributes follow 'terrible tragedy'
DUP boxing clever from outside the ring…
Unionist MP sends talks letter to SF
negotiator
Ourselves alone' for Adams at the White
House; Visit restricted to meeting with
aide
RUC chief still wary
LVP in threat to Republic's foreign
businesses
Decommissioning of democracy; Ulster
Democratic Unionist, the Rev Ian Paisley,
outlines his party's position on the day
the Stormont talks resume
Blair tries to soothe Unioinsts; Response
to 'shopping list' awaited

Michael Devine

Provos hit and run
Trimble hangs up phone during RTE
interview

Chris Thornton

Police back on the beat in Lurgan

Marie Foy
N/A

Peace vigil plea by soldier's mum
Bomb racks police base; Massive device
rips through Markethill

Mark Simpons and Deric
Henderson
Robin Morton

Unionists go in
CBI chief defends invite to Sinn Fein
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9/19/97
9/20/97
9/22/97
9/23/97

Telegraph
Belfast
Telegraph
Belfast
Telegraph
Belfast
Telegraph
Belfast
Telegraph
Belfast
Telegraph

9/24/97
1/2/98
1/5/98
1/7/98
1/8/98
1/12/98
1/14/98
1/15/98

Belfast
Telegraph
Belfast
Telegraph
Belfast
Telegraph
Belfast
Telegraph
Belfast
Telegraph
Belfast
Telegraph
Belfast
Telegraph
Belfast
Telegraph

1/19/98
Belfast
Telegraph
1/20/98
Belfast
Telegraph
1/21/98
1/22/98

Belfast
Telegraph
Belfast
Telegraph

1/23/98
1/26/98
1/27/98

Belfast
Telegraph
Belfast
Telegraph

Enda McClafferty

Trimble to face Adams; Stormont date to
confront on links with IRA
Burke Pushes for alternative chairman for
North-South talks
Brooke approved IRA talk; Minister gave
his consent to summit
Stormont Showdown; Ulster Unionists in
bid to have Adams ejected from talks
Ulster's border towns gear up for the
influx of shoppers; Christmas gift awaiting
Derry

Chris Thornton

LVF murder claim 'true'

Paul Connelly
Mark Simpson

We still support truce - loyalists
Ross disputes wisdom of the Maze
meeting

Paul Connelly

Jail jams mobile phone signals

Noel McAdam

DUP renews obejctions to talks
Maginnis speaks out over robbery case;
Mo urged to esplain how trial collapsed

Mark Simpson
Barry White
Paul Connelly
Mark Simpson

Chris Thornton
Chris Thornton

N/A

End these abhorrent killings
Ira 'leaks' saga takes new twist; Minsiters
'held back security data because of White
House'

Desmond McCartan and
Martina Purdy

Ira ceasefire will hold; But Mowlam warns
Ulster could face terror spiral

Martina Purdy and
Desmond Mcartan
Paul Connelly

Maze furore hits minister; Ingram ignored
security advice: claim
Peace crisis deepends; Provos trying to
scare Government: Maginnis

Gavin Maira, Martina
Purdy and Paul Connelly

Men quizzed over loyalist gun attacks

Noel McAdam
Noel McAdam

Civil servants find agreement elisuve
Maze residents must demand urgent cash
injection
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Belfast
Telegraph
1/28/98
1/30/98
4/1/98
4/2/98
4/3/98

Belfast
Telegraph
Belfast
Telegraph
Belfast
Telegraph
Belfast
Telegraph
Belfast
Telegraph

4/6/98
4/7/98
4/8/98
4/9/98
4/10/98
4/13/98
4/14/98

Belfast
Telegraph
Belfast
Telegraph
Belfast
Telegraph
Belfast
Telegraph
Belfast
Telegraph
Belfast
Telegraph
Belfast
Telegraph

4/16/98
4/17/98
4/20/98

Belfast
Telegraph
Belfast
Telegraph
Belfast
Telegraph

4/23/98
4/27/98
4/28/98
4/29/98
4/30/98
5/1/98

Belfast
Telegraph
Belfast
Telegraph
Belfast
Telegraph
Belfast
Telegraph
Belfast
Telegraph

Desmond McCartan and
Martina Purdy

Heat rises in London; Unionists and SF
clash over contact

Paul Connelly

UDP fails to secure talks admission date

Chris Thornton

Michael Devine

UDP tells inspector jails are 'unique'
Dail praises bomb swoop; Sixth Garda
weapons seizure since January
Fears of bomb blitz to wreck talks
progress

Desmond McCartan (in
London)

Mayhew attacks RUC probe; New move
could undermine force

N/A
Suzanne Rodgers

Crowd urged to sink 'deal'
Killing is condemned all round; Murder
sparks death list claims

Martina Purdy

Dissident unionists issue talks atatement

Paul Connelly

Land marks on the rocky road to deal

N/A
Chris Thornton & Enda
McClafferty

Trauma lingers for terror ordeal Alice
Republicans warn 'struggle' not over yet;
INLA warns of more violence after accord

Chris Thornton (security
correspondent)

Martina Purdy

Prisoners out in over a year; 70% face
release in 14 months under Agreement
Posers over prisoners; Hiccup starting to
appear already
Sinn Fein to oush the system to limits;
Party considers tactical change

Desmond McCartan (in
London)

Disarm or we're going nowhere'; Blair
spells out formula for progress

Malachi O'Doherty

Facing their fantasies

Michael Devine

Torture theory in border killing case

William Allen

Two ordered out of city
IRA ambivalence; Arms defiance:
Provisionals can't have it both ways
Ulster: The Deal; Selfishly feeding the
terrorist tiger

Chris Thornton

Chris Thornton

N/A
N/A
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7/16/98
7/23/98
7/24/98
7/27/98
7/31/98

Belfast
Telegraph
Belfast
Telegraph
Belfast
Telegraph
Belfast
Telegraph
Belfast
Telegraph

N/A

Rebel' terror warning" Gardai in alert over
'real' IRA membership
Mortar attack terror alert; Return of the
feared 'barrack buster'
IRA linked to murder' Provos involved say
detectives
Where is the trust?: Reducing division:
Steps needed from republicans

Desmond McCartan

Mayhew attacks Mo over releases

Michael Devine
Chris Thornton
Paul Connelly
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